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A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF MARYlAND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND DISQUALIFICATION DUE TO
INTOXICATION: "SOLE CAUSE" IS NOT THE ONLY WAY
TO PROCEED
I.

INTRODUCTION

The basic premise of the workers' compensation system is that,
in the event of a workplace injury, regardless of fault, workers forfeit their right to sue employers in exchange for a guaranteed and
defined set of benefits.! However, workers' compensation claims
have continually increased and now cost the United States economy
billions of dollars. 2 One reason is the rise in alcohol and drug related workplace accidents. 3 A 1990 study conducted by the National
Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., (NCCI) discovered that
there is a high correlation between per capita alcohol consumption,
alcohol related job injuries, and average workers' compensation
costs. 4 The NCCI concluded that a "[ten] percent reduction in alcohol consumption in 1989 could have reduced workers' compensation costs by $2.5 billion."5 Therefore, "state workers' compensation
laws have been increasingly used as a tool to discourage the use of
drugs and alcohol in the workplace. "6
Since 1993, the Maryland Legislature has been involved in a
continuing effort to limit the ability of employees to receive workers' compensation benefits when injured in alcohol and drug related accidents. These attempts have focused on lowering the employer's and insurer's burden for establishing the defense of drug
or alcohol intoxication under section 9-506 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code. 7 Prior to October 1, 1998,
the law required the employer to compensate a worker injured on
1. See, e.g., ARTHUR LARsON & LEX K LARsON, LARsON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION §
1.10, at 1-1 (Matthew Bender Desk ed. 1999).
2. See Kim Lucky & Ann Bok, Drug-Free Workplace Programs: A Review of State 1<-]forts, "reprinted" in National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. 1
(1996).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. [d.
6. [d.

7. See infra Part V,B for a complete legislative history.
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the job while intoxicated unless the employer could demonstrate by
substantial evidence that the sole reason for the injury was intoxication. 8 This "sole cause" standard of review has proved an onerous
burden for an employer to satisfy.9
Therefore, section 9-506 of the Labor and Employment Article
of the Maryland Code was amended in 1998 to replace the standard
of review for workers' compensation benefits resulting from a workplace injury caused by drugs or alcohol.1° Under the new standard
all benefits, except for medical treatment, are denied to a covered
employee if the primary cause,l1 as opposed to the former sole cause,
of an accidental personal injury12 is: (1) the intoxication of the employee while on duty, or (2) the effect of a controlled dangerous
substance, the use of which was not in accordance with a prescription of a physician. 13 Now the employer has the burden of proving
that the effect of the controlled dangerous substance or the alcohol
was only the primary cause of the accident.14
By enacting this legislation, Maryland has essentially fallen in
line with other states who have tried to reduce the number of:
[D]rug-and-alcohol related workplace accidents by denying
workers compensation benefits to employees if they were injured on the job due to intoxication or drug use. Currently,
forty-four states deny benefits to workers injured due to intoxication; thirty-six of those states include the use of drugs
under the statute. Another four states reduce benefits to
workers injured due to drug use or intoxication. Eleven
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(f) (1) (1991).
See infra Part V.A (discussing the "sole cause" standard of review in Maryland).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (1999).
For a discussion of primary cause, see infra notes 271-74 and accompanying
text.
12. Accidental personal injury is defined as:
(1) an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment; (2) an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of a third
person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee; or (3) a disease or infection that
naturally results from an accidental injury that arises out of and in
the course of employment, including: (i) an occupational disease;
and (ii) frostbite or sunstroke caused by a weather condition.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-101 (1999).
13. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(b)-(c) (1991).
14. See id. § 9-506(d) (forbidding recovery if the primary cause of an accidental
personal injury was intoxication).
8.
9.
10.
11.
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states have "rebuttable presumption" provisions relating to
injuries due to intoxication or drugs. IS
This Comment describes the national development of the workers' compensation system,16 illustrates the nature of workers' compensation in general terms, and provides a background for the
workers' compensation system in MarylandP It discusses the statutory defense of intoxication 18 and explains the effects of intoxication and drug use in the workplace. 19 Maryland case law relating to
sole cause is examined,20 including the legislative history of Maryland's workers' compensation statute as it pertains to alcohol or
drug-induced injuries. 21 The Comment compares and contrasts existing intoxication defense statutes in other states and examines relevant case law. 22 This Comment concludes with a prediction of issues Maryland courts may encounter as a result of modifying the
intoxication defense under the workers' compensation statute. 23
II. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM
Prior to 1800 the common law principle of respondeat superior
required a master to be liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of a servant to fellow servants and to third parties. 24 In 1837, Lord
Abinger created an exception to this rule in Priestley v. Fowler. 25
There, a butcher was held not liable when his servant negligently
overloaded a van that subsequently broke down and injured another employee. 26 The court reasoned that holding a master liable
for all mishaps would be unfair, as there were many that could
occur. 27
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Appendix.
See infra notes 24-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 73-120 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra notes 307-69, 315-77, 388-513 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 379-87 and accompanying text and Part VII.
See LARsON, supra note I, § 4.20, at 2-2 to 2-3; see also RICHARD P. GILBERT &
ROBERT L. HUMPHREYS, JR., MARYlAND WORKERS' COMPENSATION HANDBOOK §
1.1-3, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1993); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 80, at 568 (5th ed. 1984).
25. 3 Mees. & Welsby I, reprinted in 150 Reprint 1030, 1032 (1837).
26. See id. at I, 5, 150 Reprint at 1032.
27. See id.
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From Priestley, three common law defenses developed: (l)implied contract,28 implying that the employer was not liable; (2) assumption of risk,29 absolving the employer of responsibility; and (3)
contributory negligence,3o relieving the employer of responsibility if
the employee contributed in any way to the injury.31 These defenses
greatly reduced an employer's liability.32 Generally, the only time an
employer was liable was when the injury was a direct result of the
employer's negligence or fault. 33 Even then, the employer had a low
burden of proof to establish a defense. 34 As long as the employer
could show reasonably prudent measures were taken to maintain a
safe work environment, the courts held the employee to be equally
responsible for providing notice to the employer of any unsafe
working conditions. 35 However, when the employee did notify the
employer of an unsafe working condition prior to injury, the employee would encounter difficulty gathering any witnesses to corroborate the report, as the witnesses were hesitant to testify for fear of
retaliation. 36
During the Industrial Revolution, there were frequent and severe injuries to factory workers.3? Recognizing this problem, legisla28. See BLACK'S LAw DICIlONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999) (defining an implied contract
as "[a]n obligation imposed by law because of the conduct of the parties, or
some special relationship between them, or because one of them would otherwise be unjustly enriched").
29. See id. at 121 (defining assumption of risk as "[t]he act or an instance of a
prospective plaintiff's taking on the risk of loss, injury, or damage").
30. See id. at 1056 (defining contributory negligence as "[a] plaintiff's own negligence that played a part in causing the plaintiff's injury").
31. See LARsON, supra note I, § 4.30, at 24 (noting that any negligence on the part
of the employee, even if less than the employer's, would defeat recovery). See
also GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 24, at § 1.1, at 3; MAURICE J. PRESSMAN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § I-I, at 1 (1970); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 24, § 80, at 569.
32. See LARsON, supra note I, § 4.30, at 24 (concluding that employees are remediless in 83% of all workers' compensation cases); GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra
note 24, § 1.1, at 2-3; PRESSMAN, supra note 31, § I-I, at 1; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 24, § 80, at 568-69.
33. See LARsON, supra note I, § 4.30, at 24; PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 24, § 80,
at 569.
34. See lARsoN, supra note I, § 4.30, at 24 to 2-5; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
24, § 80, at 569.
35. See LARsON, supra note 1, § 4.30, at 24 to 2-5; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
24, § 80, at 569-71.
36. See LARSON, supra note I, § 4.30, at 2-5.
37. See Timothy A. Watson & Michael J. Valen, A Histuric Review of Worker:s' Compensation Reform in Florida, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 501, 502 (1993).
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tors enacted workers' compensation laws. 38 Nonetheless, success of
recovery was minimal under these early statutes. 39 With the growth
of industry came increased protection for the employee as the "unpredictability [of] an often ad hoc system of employee compensation
became intolerable . . .. "40 Employer susceptibility to liability for
the injured worker's injuries increased. 41 As a result, the defenses of
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant
rule eviscerated. 42 Although the pendulum shifted to favor the employee, the employer's liability remained limited to medical care
and lost wages, thereby precluding recovery of future wages. 43
Two primary models for workers' compensation laws developed
during this time in Germany and England. 44 In 1884, Germany created a workers' compensation system as part of an overall package
of benefits addressing health insurance, elder care, and disability
care. 45 Both employers and workers paid the costs of this workers'
compensation system. 46 Employees received sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of their salary in indemnity and disability benefits, with disability determinations made by physicians. 47
The British created their system in 1897, featuring a more resolute set of benefits. 48 The system provided compensation only for
workplace injuries resulting from the employer's negligence. 49 It did
not cover injuries caused by the employee's own negligence. 5o In addition, employees had the option of bringing either a tort action or
a workers' compensation claim in the judicial system.51
3S. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, § SO, at 573.
39. See GILBERT & HUMPRE\S, supra note 24, § 1.1, at 2. The majority of workers
did not receive anything. See id.
40. Id. § 1.1, at 3.
41. See GILBERT & HUMPRE\S, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 15.
42. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, § SO, at 575-76 (pointing out that many
workers' compensation statutes abrogated some or all of these defenses).
43. See Watson, supra note 37, at 502.
44. See William E. Sadowski et al., The 1979 Worker.s' Compensation Reform: Back to
Basics, 7 FlA. ST. U. L. REv. 640, 642-45 (1979). See also GILBERT & HUMPRE\S,
supra note 24, § 1.2, at 15-16.
45. See Sadowski et al., supra note 44, at 642.
46. See id. at 643. The employees paid two-thirds and employers paid one-third
into the Sickness Fund, employers paid all 100% to the Accident Fund, and
the costs were shared 50/50 for the Disability Fund. See id.
47. See id. at 643-44.
4S. See id. at 644.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. This is opposed to the modem system, where workers' compensation is
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By the end of the nineteenth century, the increase of industrial
injuries and decrease of remedies in the United States created an
environment for radical change. 52 Beginning in 1904 "various state
commissions prompted by industrialization and the resulting increase in workplace and railroad injuries engaged in intensive investigation into the issues surrounding worker's compensation programs."53 In 1910, these various state commissions joined forces and
drafted the Uniform Workmen's Compensation Law. 54 However,
there was considerable debate at this conference, leading individual
states to enact their own forms of workers' compensation legislation. 55 Two states, Washington and Ohio, patterned their workers'
compensation programs after Germany's model, while most states
chose the British modeI.56
Maryland lead the national movement by enacting the first legislation to address workers' compensation. 57 As other states followed
suit, the first worker's compensation laws were repealed by courts as
unconstitutiona1. 58 The unfortunate result was the development of
an unsuccessful system that provided only for voluntary or elective
participation in compensation programs. 59 However, in 1913, New
an exclusive remedy. See id.
52. See LARsON, supra note 1, § 5.20, at 2-12; GILBERT & HU~PHREYS, supra note 24,
§ 1.2, at 14-15.
53. LARsON, supra note 1, § 5.20, at 2-12. The creation of these commissions began
in Massachusetts in 1904, Illinois in 1907, Connecticut in 1908, and New York
in 1909. See id. Soon after Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Wisconsin, Washington and Montana also created their own commissions. See id.
54. See id. The laws were drafted at a 1910 conference in Chicago. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Sadowski, supra note 44, at 644.
57. See 1902 Md. Laws Ch. 139, 218-19. See also LARsON, supra note 1, § 5.20, at 212; GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 16 ("Maryland broke the
ground for America in 1902 by creating a law which established an 'Employers and Employees Cooperative Insurance Fund.'")
58. See LARsON, supra note 1, § 5.20, at 2-12 to 2-15 (discussing the passing and
striking down of the first workers' compensation laws). In Maryland, Judge
Stockbridge declared the first workers' compensation law unconstitutional because it prohibited workers from pursuing their rights under Article 5 (right
to a jury trial) and Article 19 (remedy by law for injury to person or property) of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. See Franklin v.
United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore, 2 Baltimore City Rep. 309, 309 (1904)
(declaring the Act unconstitutional as it was "framed in total disregard of the
provisions of the Constitution").
59. See LARsON, supra note 1, § 5.20, at 2-12 to 2-15 (discussing the passage and
failures of the first workers' compensation laws).
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York successfully adopted a constitutional, compulsory system. 60
Only eight states had not adopted compensation acts by 1920; Hawaii was the last state to enact legislation in 1963. 61
The intent of the new laws was to provide a more humanitarian
approach to protecting industrial workers.62 Borrowing much from
Great Britain, states began to depart from the common law rules
and provide greater remedies for workers in hazardous industries by
protecting employees and their dependents from an unexpected
loss of income. 63
These laws were also considered beneficial to employers. 64 In
states that implemented workers' compensation procedures, these
laws became the exclusive remedy for employees. 65 This protected
employers from the uncertainties of litigation. 66 In support of this
reasoning, the Supreme Court of the United States wrote that:
[I] n the highly organized and hazardous industries of the
present day[,] the causes of accident[s] are often so obscure and complex that in a material proportion of cases it
is impossible by any method correctly to ascertain the facts
necessary to form an accurate judgment, and in a still
larger proportion the expense and delay required for such
ascertainment amount in effect to a defeat in justice. 67

60. See id. § 5.20, at 2-15.
61. See id. § 5.30, at 2-15.
62. See GILBERT & HUMPHRE)s, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 14-16 (labeling the occurrence of employee injuries as the underlying reasons for the acts); PRESSMAN,
supra note 31, § 1-1, at 1:
Social philosophers maintained that the common-law rules of tort liability were inconsistent with modern industrial conditions and that
the repair of the human machine [the i~ured employee] should be
made a part of the cost of producing the employer's goods, as is the
cost of repairing the physical machinery of the employer.
Id.
63. See GILBERT & HUMPRE)s, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 16; see also Johnson v.
Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 249-51, 503 A.2d 708, 709-11
(1986) (setting out the history of workers' compensation law).
64. See GILBERT & HUMPHRE)s, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 15-16 (noting that the workers' compensation laws struck a balance between the interests of the employees, employers, and society); PRESSMAN, supra note 31, § 1-1, at 1-2.
65. See PRESSMAN, supra note 31, § 1-1, at 1 (noting that the laws took away an employee's common law right to sue their employer).
66. See id.
67. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917) (assessing the New
York workers' compensation law and finding it constitutional).
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During the legislative session of the Maryland General Assembly
in 1914, Governor Phillips Lee Goldsborough introduced the Workmen's Compensation Act. 68 This bill was introduced given the rise
of industrialization and railroads that resulted in an increase in
workplace injuries. 69 Senate Bill 106 was approved on April 16, 1914
by the General Assembly.70 The purpose of this new act was to distribute equitably the burden of workplace accidents among the
State, its taxpayers, employees, and employers. 71
III. NATURE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM AND EXCEPTIONS TO COMPENSATION72

A.

The Nature of Workers' Compensation Laws Defined

Workers' compensation is a system of social legislation and insurance for working members of society.73 The right to receive benefits is based on a social theory of providing support and a level of
security for an injured worker.74 One principle cited as a reason for
the development of these systems is the premise that workers' compensation is to provide disability-income insurance, not liability insurance. 75 Workers' compensation provides an efficient and defined
system for providing an injured worker prompt financial and medical benefits and allows for the proper allocation of the costs and
68. 1914 Md. Laws 1429 ch. 800.
69. See id. Goldsborough appointed a committee to report its considerations regarding the workmen's compensation system. See Karns v. Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 275 Md. 1,6, 338 A.2d 251, 254-55 (1975).
70. See 1914 Md. Laws 1429, 1464 ch. 800.
71. See id. at 1429; see also GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 15-16;
PRESSMAN, supra note 31, § 1-2, at 2-3.
72. For other general sources on the nature of workers' compensation see EARL F.
CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 1961); JACK B. HOOD ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE
PROTECTION LAws (3d ed. 1999); WILLIAM R. SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORK·
MEN'S COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1958); HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY
SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1954).
73. See LARsON, supra note 1, § 1.00, at 1-1 to 1-3; GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra
note 24, § 2.1, at 17-19; Richard A. Epstein, The Histarical Origins and Economic
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800·.()3 (1982).
74. See generally LARsON, supra note I, § 1.00, at 1-1 to 1-3; GILBERT & HUMPHREYS,
supra note 24, § 2.1, at 17-19; Epstein, supra note 73, at 800-03.
75. See Arthur Larson, Basic Concepts and Objectives of Workmen's Compensation, "reprint" in Supplemental Studies for the National Committee on State Workmen's Compensation Law 31, 31-32 (Peter S. Barth, Director, Monroe
Berkowitz, et aI., eds. 1973).
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the burdens of the system. 76 This is accomplished by requiring employers to purchase workers' compensation insurance from which a
worker can receive financial and medical benefits while recovering
from an injury.77 Furthermore, the system allows the cost of the insurance to be passed on to the consumer of the product or service
provided by the employer. 78
The work-related injuries covered by workers' compensation
laws include accidental personal injuries that "arise out of and in
the course of" employment. 79 The time, place, and circumstances of
the accident are examined in determining if an injury arises "in the
course of" employment. 8o "An injury arises out of employment
when, after considering all the facts and circumstances of the case,
it is apparent to a rational mind that there was a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the ensuing injury."81 The cause of the accident must
be incidental to employment and not independent of the employment relationship.82 As such, fault is not usually an issue related to
compensability.83
76. See id. at 36-37 (discussing the prompt and simple administration of workers'
compensation laws).
77. See id. at 31-32.
78. See id. at 32.
0
79. LARsON. supra note 1, § 6.00, at 3-1. See also id. §§ 6.00 to 13.24, at 3-1 to 3-162
(discussing "arising out of the employment") and §§ 14.00 - 19.63, at 4-1 to 4119 (discussing "course of employment"); see generally Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 375, 128 A.2d 635, 637 (1925) (providing
that an employee who has sustained an injury arising out of and in the course
of employment has a sole remedy under the Workers' Compensation Act).
Whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment is ordinarily a question of fact, "but when the facts have been ascertained and agreed
upon by the parties, or are undisputed, and there is no dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one of law and
may be decided by the Court." Harrison v. Central Constr. Co., 135 Md. 170,
180, 108 A. 874, 878 (1919).
80. LARsON, supra note 1, § 14.00, at 4-1 (explaining that there must be a showing
the injury occurred within the "time and space boundaries of the employment" and in the course of an employment activity).
81. Blake Constr. Co. v. Wells, 245 Md. 282, 289, 225 A.2d 857, 862 (1967). Accord
Consolidated Eng'g Co. v. Feiken, 188 Md. 420, 424-25, 52 A.2d 913, 916
(1947); Weston-Dodson Co. v. Carl, 156 Md. 535, 538, 144 A. 708, 709 (1929).
82. See Consolidated Eng'g Co., 188 Md. at 424, 52 A.2d at 916.
83. See Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 260 Md. 651, 66(k)1, 273 A.2d 125, 131
(1971) (reiterating that the workers' compensation laws are applied without
regard to fault or negligence of the employer); Victory Sparkler & Specialty
Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 377, 128 A.2d 635, 638 (1925) (recognizing that
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The Exceptions

Most jurisdictions have incorporated into their statutory laws
specific exceptions to compensability that state common law has further defined. 84 There are certain defenses that an employer can
raise if employees deviate from their course of employment or are
guilty of some form of misconduct. 85 Three common statutory defenses available to employers are deliberate or intentional act,86 willful misconduct,87 and intoxication. 88

1.

Deliberate or Intentional

There is a presumption in workers' compensation claims that
the personal injury of a claimant was accidentaI.B9 However, if substantial evidence indicates that the injury or death was intentionally
self-inflicted, the causal nexus of an injury "arising out of" the
course of employment is broken90 and claimants or their estates are

84.
85.

86.
87.
88.

89.

90.

under the Workers' Compensation Act, the statutory definition of compensable injury makes no reference to fault of the employee, except in expressly
defined cases).
See GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 24, § 6.0, at 97.
See LARsON, supra note 1, § 30.00, at 6-1. If the issue of a deviation is raised,
the lawyer should focus on three issues: (1) whether a deviation occurred, (2)
whetherothe deviation was significant, and (3) whether the injury was related
to the deviation. See GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 24, § 6.1, at 98.
For a discussion of deliberate or intentional act see infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of willful misconduct see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
See LARsON, supra note 1, § 4.31, at 6-33 (summarizing intoxication statutes);
GILBERT & HUMPHREYS, supra note 29, §§ 6.1-6.5, at 103-04. See MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (1991) (providing that an employee is not entitled to
compensation if caused solely by intoxication); PRESSMAN, supra note 31,
§ 2.6(9), at 54. For a discussion of intoxication see infra notes 115-39 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(f) (1) (1999); Krell v. Maryland Drydock Co., 184 Md. 428, 435, 41 A.2d 502, 505 (1945) (interpreting the Maryland Code presumption that death cannot be occasioned by the willful misconduct of an employee).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(a)(l) (1999); see also Baltimore &
Ohio RR v. Brooks, 158 Md. 149, 161, 148 A. 276, 281 (1930) (resolving a
case in favor of an employer because the accidental personal injury arising
out of employment did not cause the employee's insanity and suicide). But see
Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 303 Md. 182, 191, 492 A.2d 1270,
1274 (1985) (stating that a suicide attempt may not always break the causal
nexus between an accidental injury and the employee's suicide attempt); Baber v. John C. Knipp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 68, 163 A. 862, 867 (1933) (declar-
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barred from any recovery.91
2.

Willful Misconduct

An employee also is not entitled to compensation if the injury
is occasioned by the worker's willful misconduct.92 Willful misconduct is defined as intentionally acting, either with knowledge that
serious injury will likely result or with a wanton and reckless disregard for the probable consequences. 93 This includes exposure by an
employee to an injury if the employee knows of and appreciates the
susceptibility to injury.94
By being in a position where injury or death might reasonably
result from an act or by disregarding rules and orders, an employee
may be committing willful misconduct. 95 Willful misconduct must be
more than just thoughtlessness, heedlessness, or inadvertence. 96
Rather, there must be at least a willful breach of the rule or order. 97
For misconduct to rise to the level of willfulness, it must be proven
that the claimant's violation of the rule was deliberate or intentional98 and that the claimant's transgression occurred despite the
fact that the claimant knew or should have appreciated the risk of
injury caused by violation of the rule. 99

91.
92.
93.

94.

95.
96.

97.
98.

99.

ing a new trial where a decedent committed suicide subsequent to two surgeries for a hernia).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(a).
See id. § 9-506(e).
See Williams Constr. Co. v. Garrison, 42 Md. App. 340, 346, 400 A.2d 22, 25
(1979) (citing 99 CJ.S. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SEC. 258 (1958».
See id.; see also Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 338 A.2d 251 (1975)
(stating that willful misconduct may be found where the employee intended
to place himself in such a position that the injury or death might result).
However, an employee is not guilty of willful misconduct because he is negligent, acted imprudently, thoughtlessly, or unwisely. See Garrison, 42 Md. App.
at 346, 400 A. at 25.
See Harris v. Dobson & Co., 150 Md. 71, 76, 132 A. 374, 375 (1926).
See id.
See id.
See Red Star Motor Coaches, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Md. 412, 416-17, 163 A. 886,
888 (1933) (stating that a bus driver who died of carbon monoxide poisoning
was not guilty of willful misconduct although a company rule prohibited starting vehicles in a garage with closed doors); see also Karns, 275 Md. at 18, 338
A.2d at 260 (regarding intoxication as willful misconduct); Baltimore Car
Foundry Co. v. Ruzicka, 132 Md. 491, 492, 104 A. 167, 167 (1918) (determining that an employee's conduct was not willful because it lacked the element
of intentional impropriety; although it was a thoughtless act, it was not a willful breach of a declared rule or duty).
See Williams Constr. Co., 42 Md. App. at, 346, 400 A.2d at, 25 (concluding that
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Therefore, it can be inferred that, in order to successfully
prove willful misconduct, the employer must show five factors. loo
First, the employer must demonstrate that some company rule, regulation, or direct order existed. lol Second, the employer must offer
proof that the claimant had knowledge of the rule, regulation, or
direct order.lo2 Third, the employer must show that the claimant was
aware or should have been aware of the attendant risk of injury
caused by violating the rule, regulation, or order.lo3 Fourth, it must
be demonstrated that the claimant deliberately, not accidentally, violated the rule, regulation, or order. 104 Finally, the injury must be
sustained by the claimant's violation of the rule, regulation, or
order. lOS
As stated by one scholar, "[t]he most impressive thing about
the [misconduct] defense is the variety of situations in which it has
not succeeded."lo6 The most common ground the courts use to reject the misconduct defense is the absence of employee "willfulness. "107 Notwithstanding that a certain act is careless or prohibited
by a safety rule, the employer has the difficult burden of rebutting
the presumption that the employee's act was not willful. 108

100.
101.
102.

103.

104.
105.
106.
107.

108.

the claimant's work as a tree uimmer with knowledge that he suffered from
dizzy spells did not constitute willful misconduct when serious injuries occurred by falling from a ladder).
See infra notes 101-{)5 and accompanying text.
See Harris, 150 Md. at 76, 132 A. at 375 (stating that willful misconduct may
consist of a willful breach of a rule or order).
See Red Star Motor Coaches, 163 Md. at 416-17, 163 A. at 888 (clarifying that willful misconduct requires proof of the claimant's appreciation of the rule and
the danger caused by its violation, i.e., a willful breach).
WiUiams Constr. Co., 42 Md. App. at 346, 400 A.2d at 25 (" [M)isconduct includes the exposure by an employee to an injury if he knows of, and appreciates, his liability to injury.")
See id.
See id.
2 ARTHUR LARsON & LEX K LARsON. LARsON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw §
34.02, at 34-35 (Reg. ed. 1999) [herinafter "Larson", Reg. ed.]
[d.; see also Ruzicka, 132 Md. at 492-93, 104 A. at 168 (determining that an employee's conduct was not willful because it lacked the element of intentional
impropriety; although it was a thoughtless act, it was not a willful breach of a
declared rule or duty); F.B. Beasman & Co. v. Butler, 133 Md. 382, 387-88, 105
A. 409, 410-11 (1918) (holding there was no willful misconduct where the employee attempting to board a rapidly moving truck was not deliberate, but
merely spur of the moment conduct).
See Red Star Motor Coaches, 163 Md. at 416-17, 163 A. at 88 (discussing the burden of proof for willful misconduct). See generally MD. CODE ANN .. LAB. & EMPL.
§ 9-506(f) (1) (1999) ("In a proceeding on a claim for compensation, there is,
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Intoxication Generally

As courts construe the willful misconduct exception for compensation broadly, a more specific statutory defense is required if
an employer intends to properly disqualify a claimant.109 One such
statutory defense that the majority of jurisdictions have adopted is
employee intoxication. 11o
Maryland law delineates between raising the willful misconduct
defense and the intoxication defense. l11 For instance, in Karns v.
Liquid Carbonic Corp.,112 the employee had been involved in a car accident as the result of intoxication and the employer claimed this
also violated known company policy.113 In essence, the employer had
raised two statutory defenses to the employee's claim for compensation, willful misconduct and intoxication.l1 4 However, this created a
problem for both the employer and insurer, as the alleged misconduct only involved intoxication. 11s
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an employer is not
entitled to raise the statutory defense of willful misconduct where

109.

110.

111.

112.
113.

114.
115.

absent substantial evidence to the contrary, a presumption that an accidental
personal injury . . . was not caused by the intent of the covered employee to
injure or kill the covered employee or another individual.")
See Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 20-21, 338 A.2d 251, 262 (1975)
(declaring that there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident
and that only where intoxication or willful misconduct is the sole cause of an
accident will the employee be barred from recovery). See generally Red Star Motar Coaches, 163 Md. at 416-17, 163 A. at 888 (clarifying that not all employee
violations of rules amount to willful misconduct and that some employee misconduct will not mean an employee is not entitled to compensation); Harris
v. R.P. Dobson & Co., 150 Md. 71, 76, 132 A. 374, 375-76 (1926) (concluding
that where a willful breach of a rule or order is not clear, the question must
be decided as one of fact, and the decision of the commissioner is taken as
presumptively correct).
See Appendix.
See Karns, 275 Md. at 17-21, 338 A.2d at 260-62 (discussing both the intoxication and willful misconduct defenses); see also infra Part IV.A for a detailed discussion of the intoxication defense.
275 Md. 1, 338 A.2d 251 (1975).
See id. at 4-6, 338 A.2d at 253-54 (showing that the employer's rule provided
that "drunkenness, drinking during working hours, ... or being under the
influence of liquor or drugs during working hours, including lunch time, constituted grounds for immediate dismissal.") (quoting the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland).
See id. at 3, 338 A.2d at 253.
See id. at 18, 338 A.2d at 261 ("It must be borne in mind ... that the only
misconduct alleged relates to intoxication.").

296

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

that defense relies solely on the allegation that the misconduct was
due to intoxication. 116 The court's rationale hinged on statutory
construction and legislative intent. ll7 Specifically, the court stated:
[W]e regard it as highly significant that the original proposal for a workmen's compensation act called for barring an
employee from receiving compensation where the "injury
[was] caused ... by his intoxication," with no mention of any
type of willful misconduct other than intoxication as a bar
and no presumption written into it relative to intoxication,
but what was enacted by the General Assembly barred the
employee on the basis of willful misconduct "or the intoxication of such employe [sic]" with a presumption written
into the statute" [t]hat the injury did not result solely from
the intoxication of the injured employe [sic] while on
duty." 118
The court also noted that the General Assembly amended the
statute to modifY the presumption so that "an employee is barred
from receiving compensation if his injury results from his willful
misconduct or 'result[s] solely from the intoxication of the injured
employee.' "119 Hence, if an employer does not prevail on the intoxication defense, there is no alternative theory to use based on the
claimant's alleged intoxication. By tracing the legislative history and
intent, it is clear that an employer cannot use intoxication to sustain the statutory defense of willful misconduct in Maryland. 120

IV.

INTOXICATION DEFENSE MORE CLOSELY EXAMINED

A.

Intoxication as a Statutory Defense

Intoxication levels that render an employee incapable of working are a clear deviation from the "course of employment."121 However, under the statutory defense of intoxication, the standard of
proof varies among states. 122 In some states, an employer must only
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 20, 338 A.2d at 262.
See id.
Id. at 20-21, 338 A.2d at 262 (emphasis added).
Id. at 21, 338 A.2d at 262 (emphasis added).
See id.
LARsON Reg. ed., supra note 106, § 36.02, at 36-13 (noting that when an employee reaches "an advanced stage of intoxication," he is incapable of engaging in duties of an employment).
122. See id. § 36.03 [1], at 36-15 to 36-16; see also Appendix (listing each state and its
requisite statutory standard of proof for intoxication).
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show the existence of intoxication at the time of injury; while in
others, an employer is forced to prove intoxication was the sole
cause of the injury.123
Every state recognizes that not all alcohol-related workplace injuries should be compensable in the same manner as substance
abuse-related accidents. 124 Yet, each state handles its claims and disqualifications relating to substance abuse work-related accidents differently.125 A few states eliminate only partial benefits to a claimant. 126 Nine states either require employers to be engaged or give
credit127 to employers who are engaged in the Drug Free Workplace
program. 128
Generally, all states with relevant statutory provisions deny employees' compensation when an injury is caused by their own intoxication.129 However, the standards vary greatly.13o Approximately half
of the country eliminates benefits on a slight causal connection between the intoxication and the personal injury, utilizing some variation of a "caused by," "due to," or "occasioned by" standard. 131
Twelve states have enacted the "proximate cause" or "natural proximate cause" standards.132 Eight states have enacted a form of "substantial factor," "primary cause," and "results directly from" stan123. See LARsON Reg. ed., supra note 106, § 36.03[1], at 36-15 to 36-16 (listing the
different types of state statutes).
124. See generally Robert T. Franklin, Workers' Compensation Law: A State-by-State Analysis, Workers' Compensation Practice Group (1997).
125. See id. The majority of states disqualify benefits under a specific intoxication
defense statute. See id; see also Appendix. Only five: Arizona, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan and Washington, disqualify benefits under a willful misconduct
defense. See id. see also Appendix.
126. See generally, Franklin, supra note 124; see also Appendix. Colorado and Idaho
mandate a fifty percent reduction in benefits, while Missouri, Utah and Wisconsin mandate a fifteen percent reduction in benefits. See id.; see also Appendix.
127. "See Kim Lucky, Drug-Free Workplace Programs: A Trend Whose Time Has Come, reprinted in NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, INC. 26 (1998) (stating that employers who comply receive discounts on their workers' compensation premiums)."
128. See id. at 26. Texas is the only state that mandates employer participation,
while AJabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia and Washington have voluntary participation. See id. at 27 (detailing
the elements of the program); Lucky & Bok, supra note 2, at 1-2.
129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Verify
130. See Appendix.
131. See Appendix.
132. See Appendix. Maryland tried to enact this standard in 1996. See infra Part V.B.
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dards.133 Maryland, prior to the legislative change, along with
Washington, D.CP4 and New York,135 apply the most stringent standard, "sole cause. "136
Sole cause review is the most difficult standard of proof for an
employer to establish 137 because a strict burden of proof-the intoxication must be the exclusive cause of the injury-is required for an
employer to sustain the defense. 138 At its most basic level, the sole
cause standard requires an employer to: (1) produce clear medical
proof that intoxication existed at the time of the accident, and (2)
prove by substantial evidence that the accident was not caused by
any other factor. 139
Since the inception of workers' compensation and disqualification of benefits due to intoxication in Maryland, the sole cause standard prevailed. 140 This standard shifted the burden of proof onto
the employer to sustain an intoxication defense. Employers had difficulty meeting this burden of proof.141 In order to more appropriately balance the evidentiary burden of defending intoxicatedrelated injuries, the Maryland General Assembly continually tries to
redraft the standard of review. 142
133. See Appendix.
134. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-303(d) (1997) (utilizing the standard "occasioned
solely by").
135. See N.Y. WORK. COMPo LAw § 10 (McKinney 1993) (utilizing the language
"solely occasioned by").
136. See MD. CODE ANN .. lAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (1991). Maryland decreased its standard in 1998 to "primary" cause. See infra Part V.B.
137. See LARsON, Reg. ed. supra note 106, § 36.03[3], at 36-22. See also infra Part
V.B and accompanying text for a discussion of the Maryland General Assembly's reasoning for altering the sole cause standard of review. See generally infra
Part V.A and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland courts' rationale in
applying the sole cause standard of review).
138. See Franklin supra note 124.
139. See LARsON, Reg. ed. supra note 106, § 36.03[3], at 36-24.
140. In 1914, the Maryland General Assembly adopted the general language of section 4 of the Uniform Workmen's Compensation Act. See Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 6-7, 338 A.2d 251, 254-55 (1975) (citing 1914 Md.
Laws 1429, ch. 800). This Act states that "[n]o compensation shall be allowed
for an injury caused (1) by the employee's wilful intention to injure himself
or to injure another, or (2) by his intoxication." [d. Within two years, the
General Assembly amended the statute to insert the word "solely." See id. at 7,
388 A.2d at 255 (citing 1916 Md. Laws ch. 597).
141. For a discussion of cases in which employers did not meet the sole cause burden of proof see infra Part V.A.
142. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of the Maryland General Assembly's efforts
during the past six years.
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Magnitude of Americas Workplace Substance Abuse Problem

The social and economic dangers of substance abuse in the
workplace are recognized and well documented. 143 Not only does
substance abuse present dangers to the general public, but it also
causes many workplace accidents. l44
Each year the problem of substance abuse grows in both public
and private sectors. 145 In 1984, only eight percent of the nation's
chief executive officers, governors, and mayors of the sixty-four largest cities deemed substance abuse a pivotal problem within their
workforces. l46 Five years later, twenty-two percent of the same individuals considered substance abuse on the job a major problemY7
According to estimates by several drug-prevention organizations, seventy-five billion to one hundred billion dollars are spent each year
143. See, e.g., Lucky & Bok, supra note 2; Shawn D. Twing, Drug & Alcohol Testing Uy
Private Employers . .. and its Relationship to Workers' Compensation Practice in Arkansas, ARK. LAw. 31 (Fall 1996); George Gallup, Jr., Strangkhold - Drugs And
The American Workplace, Baltimore County Office of Substance Abuse (April
1994) (estimating that every year drug-use costs American businesses from 50
billion to 100 billion).
144. See Lucky & Bok, supra note 2, at 1; Twing, supra note 143, at 31; Gallup, supra
note 143 ("Drug abusers are involved in 3 1/2 times more on the job accidents
than non-abusers.")
145. See Currents in Compensation and Benefits, 21 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REv. 5,
13 (1989) ("Over three-fifths of the surveyed firms using drug testing reported that both alcohol and other drugs are significant problems among
their employees. Over three-fifths of the respondents in non testing firms said
that alcohol is the primary substance abuse problem in their company.").
"The federal government's annual household survey [reported that] nearly
two-thirds of all drug users are employed ... full-time." Maryland Governor's
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Commission: Fact Sheet (1987). "In a random survey
of 5,800 municipal employees in a southwestern city, 16% said they had personal knowledge of marijuana use by co-workers; [and] 13% reported knowing of co-workers' use of other drugs." Id. Further, 24% of paraprofessionals
and 15% skilled or technical workers related knowledge of co-worker drug
use. See id. In the federal government's household survey, those who admitted
to using illegal drugs comprised 28% of the construction industry, 22.7% of
the repair services industry, 18.4% of the transportation industry, and 14.8%
of the manufacturing industry. See id. In addition, "[a] 1989 study of five large
corporations revealed that between 62 [and] 75% of employees had used alcohol while on the job, [and] more than 5% had used marijuana." Id. Furthermore, employee drug and alcohol use is said to be three times more prevalent than actually reported. See id.
146. See Currents in Compensation and Benefits, supra note 145, at 14.
147. See id. These results were concluded from a survey consisting of 265 respondents. See id.
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in lost productivity, increased health-care costs, and workers' compensation expenses caused by substance abuse. l48
Employee drug and alcohol use statistics indicate the negative
impact that substance abuse is having on the workplace. For example, the National Cocaine Helpline reported that, of the employees
that called, "75% [of them] had used drugs on the job; 64% admitted drugs adversely [affected] their job performance; 44% had sold
drugs to other employees; [and] 18% had stolen from co-workers to
support their drug habit. "149 Moreover, workers who do use drugs
are "five times more likely to file a workers' compensation claim"150
and nearly four times "more likely to be involved in a workplace accident. "151 These statistics sparked the Maryland Legislature to reconsider the intoxication defense.
V. MARYlAND'S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS AND CASE HISTORY
REGARDING WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE USE OF
CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES

A.

"Sole Cause" Case History

Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act's (the "Act") intoxication defense first came under attack in American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh. 152 Fitzhugh was the driver of a two-ton ice and coal wagon
whose duties included loading and unloading the wagon. 153 While
working, he fell or was thrown from the wagon and died. 154 The em148. See David Warner, The War on Drugs Wants You, NATION'S Bus., Feb. 1996, at 5455. Many organizations, including Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America, The Employee Assistance Professional Association, and Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace have joined forces
to combat drug abuse in the workplace. See id. To coordinate these efforts on
a national level, "[t]he U.S. Chamber of Commerce, through a nonprofit affiliate, the Center for Workplace Preparation, ... serves as a clearinghouse for
information on state and local chambers' drug-free workplace programs" in
an effort to raise awareness of drug abuse among workers in smaller companies. Id.
149. Maryland Governor's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Commission, supra note 140. In
a three-year series of continued surveys of employees' attitudes about drug
abuse and work, workers reported that drug abuse negatively affected almost
all areas of job performance, including attendance, morale, safety, productivity, health-care expenses, and crime. See id.
150. Id ..
15l. Id.
152. 128 Md. 382, 97A 999 (1916).
153. See id. at 386, 97 A. at 1000.
154. See id.

2000]

"Sole" Cause in Workers' Compensation

301

ployer, American Ice Co., presented evidence that Fitzhugh was
drunk at the time of the accident. ISS The State Industrial Accident
Commission granted the widow workers' compensation benefits and
the Baltimore City Circuit Court affirmed the Commission's decision. ls6 The employer appealed twice, both to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland and to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. ls7
Both courts affirmed the lower court's holding. ls8 The court of appeals held that where intoxication is used as a defense, the employer must prove the acc.idental personal injury was attributable
"solely and exclusively" to the intoxication of the employee while on
duty.ls9 The court reasoned that the legislative intent was to eradicate contributory negligence as a defense and to compel
compensation. 160
The next case to arise under the Act was Southern Can Co. v.
Sachs. 161 During the workday, Sachs and a co-worker purchased two
one-half pints of a1cohol. l62 They drank one bottle between 12:00
noon and 12:30 p.m., and the other between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30
p.m. 163 One witness testified that he saw Sachs drunk and staggering
at 2:15 p.m. l64 The same witness saw Sachs again at approximately
4:00 p.m., but could not determine his condition at that time. 16S Another employee, Baier, testified that he saw Sachs after 4:00 p.m. in
the bathroom seated with his head in his hands. 166 Baier indicated
to Sachs that it was time to go home and Baier exited the build. ing. 167 Baier testified that approximately seven minutes later he
heard a "noise,"168 walked back over to the entrance of the build-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.
See id. at 383, 97 A. at 1000.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 393, 97 A. at 1002 (emphasis added).
See id. at 392-93, 97 A. at 1002. The court further explained that the system of
workers' compensation was supposed to award benefits to injured workers
who suffered an unfortunate accident on the job, not considering who or
what caused the negligence. See id.
149 Md. 562, 131 A. 760 (1926).
See id. at 565, 131 A. at 761.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 564-65, 131 A. 761.
See id. at 565, 131 A. 761.
See id.
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ing, ,and discovered Sachs at the bottom of the steps, bleeding. 169
Baier testified that Sachs had fallen down the steps.170 These facts
were undisputed at trial, however, there was insufficient direct evidence to conclude the intoxication was the sole cause of Sach's injury.17I Thus, the court denied the employer's defense.172
In S. Rosenbloom, Inc. v. Willingham,173 Willingham was on his
way home from work by ferry.174 At approximately 6:00 p.m., he
drove his car onto the ferry and the deckhand noticed that Willingham had difficulty parking. 175 Willingham was seen exiting his car,
staggering, and subsequently heading to the saloon deck. 176 At trial,
another deckhand testified that Willingham had nearly drove into
him while entering the ferry.177 Before arriving, the first deckhand
saw Willingham again, "staggering more than ever, . . . [as] he
came down the wrong stairway, and had to go around the boat to
reach his car. "17S Thus, the deckhand offered to drive the car off of
the ferry and park it on dry land. 179 The deckhand testified that he
smelled alcohol as he drove with Willingham in the passenger
seat. ISO However, Willingham's wife testified that in their twenty
years of marriage, she had never seen her husband intoxicated. lSI
About thirty-five minutes after the ferry departed its post, Willingham drove his car overboard and drowned. ls2
Although the police officer who attempted to revive him did
not detect any odor of alcohol or find a bottle, evidence was offered at trial that a half-pint bottle of whiskey with one drink left
was found inside the vehicle when it was pulled from the water. IS3 In
169.
170.
171.
172.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 566, 131 A. at 761.
See id. Not only did the court deny the employer's claim of intoxication, but it
allowed a "logical inference" that, even though the employee had left his
work area and was observed resting, the injury did arise out of and in the
course of employment, as Sachs may have been returning to work when he
fell. See id.
190 Md. 552, 59 A.2d 311 (1948).
See id. at 555, 59 A.2d at 311.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 555, 59 A.2d at 312.
[d. at 555,59 A.2d at 311-12.
See id. at 555, 59 A.2d at 312.
See id.
See id. at 554, 59 A.2d at 311.
See id. at 556, 59 A.2d at 312.
See id.
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holding against the employer, the court noted that no one actually
saw the decedent drink and that, even though his conduct may
have been due to alcohol, it may also have been something else. l84
Moreover, the court explained that, although the inference of intoxication could have been drawn, the "evidence falls short of establishing that intoxication was the sole cause of the accident, as required by the statute. "185
The court in Smith v. State Roads Commission,186 for the first time
in fifty-two years, found that the employee's intoxication was the
sole factor for the employee's death. 187 In Smith, the employee
crashed his pickup truck into a telephone pole and died. 188 The evidence showed that the employee had a blood-alcohol level of .27.189
Furthermore, no evidence of a tire blowout or other tire trouble existed, nor did any evidence of a defect in the road. 190 Thus, the
court ruled the employer had met his burden of proof by providing
overwhelming and unchallenged evidence. 191
Interestingly, the court reasoned that:
[I]f the employment does no more than supply the setting,
the· stage or the situation in which the injury occurs, if it is
no more than an inactive condition and not a moving
cause, compensation must be denied. Concurrence of intoxication and the setting, alone, is not enough. There must be
in addition, if compensation is to be awarded, some active
or moving or contributing cause ... [Otherwise] the Maryland statute is meaningless and we do not agree that it is
meaningless. 192
Therefore, Smith created the rule that as long as the employer
presents substantial evidence of intoxication and the employee or
his estate offers no evidence of any other potential or contributing
factor, the employer may prevail.l 93 However, it is important to note
that the employee's task is not a difficult one. The employee must
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 558, 59 A.2d at 313.
[d.
240 Md. 525, 214 A.2d 792 (1965).
See id.
See id. at 527, 214 A.2d at 793.
See id.
See id. at 530, 214 A.2d at 794.
See id. at 529, 214 A.2d at 793.
[d. at 535,214 A.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
See id. at 534-35, 214 A.2d at 797.

304

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

only offer another "possible" cause of the work-related accident. 194
For example, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lorkovic,195 the employee was injured in a one-car accident when he was driving his
truck home from the airport after a business trip.196 The evidence
established that Lorkovic was suffering from sleep deprivation and
intoxication when he began his drive. 197 The jury found for the employee, and the employer appealed, relying on Smith. 198 The employer claimed, as a matter of law, that Lorkovic's intoxication was
the sole cause of his injuries; therefore, he was precluded from the
recovery of benefits. 199 Nonetheless, the court pointed out that, unlike the employee in Smith, Lorkovic was still living and offered his
own sworn testimony.2oo Hence, because Lorkovic was able to establish another "possible" cause, it was reasonable for a jury to decide
in Lorkovic's favor. 201
In Zentz v. Peters & Taylor, Inc.,202 the trial court affirmed the
Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of a compensation
claim.203 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that the lower court's finding that injuries sustained by the
claimant in a fight with a co-worker were due solely to his intoxication was not clearly erroneous. 204 The supervisor testified that the
194. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lorkovic, 100 Md. App. 333, 360, 641 A2d 924, 937
(1994) (suggesting sleep deprivation during a business trip was a proximate
cause of employee's injuries); see also S. Rosenbloom, Inc. v. Willingham, 190
Md. 552, 558, 59 A.2d 311, 313 (1948) (declaring intoxication as the contributing cause to be insufficient, as it must be the exclusive cause); Southern Can
Co. v. Sachs, 149 Md. 562, 566, 131 A. 760, 761 (1926) (stating evidence did
not show the injury or death of the employee resulted solely from the alleged
intoxication); American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 393, 97 A. 999, 1002
(1916) (requiring accident resulting in injury to be caused solely and exclusively by the intoxication of the employee in order to receive compensation).
195. 100 Md. App. 333, 641 A.2d 924 (1994).
196. See id. at 340, 641 A2d at 927.
197. See id. at 360, 641 A.2d at 937. The claimant proffered that his business trip
caused his sleep deprivation-the reason he fell asleep at the wheel. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 361, 641 A.2d at 937.
201. See id. Therefore, the court held that it was without authority to overrule the
jury decision. See id. at 360-62, 641 A.2d at 937-38.
202. 11 Md. App. 1,272 A.2d 430 (1971).
203. See id.
204. See id. at 2, 272 A.2d at 431. The Commission denied the claim not only because of the claimant's intoxication, but also as a result of provoking the
fight. See id. at 2-3, 272 A.2d at 430-31.
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claimant "appeared" to have been drinking, though he would not
describe him as drunk. 205 Controversy existed over how much alcohol was actually consumed, as well as the events that led to the argument and resulting injuries. 206 However, both the co-worker and
the claimant stated that the fight would not have occurred absent
drinking. 207 Thus, the court ruled in favor of the employer, reasoning that:
[H]ad appellant not been intoxicated there would have
been no fight. Had there been no fight he would not have
been injured. Thus the injuries were the result of the intoxication and a determination that the injuries were due
solely to the intoxication is not clearly erroneous [and]
compensation was properly denied. 20B
Hence, the claimant was justifiably disqualified from receiving workers' compensation benefits due to his intoxication. 209
The Maryland statute that disqualifies claimants from receiving
workers' compensation benefits due to intoxication encompasses
more than just alcohol-induced intoxication. The statute also disqualifies claimants intoxicated as a result of illegal or prescription
drugs not taken in accordance with a physician's prescription. 2lO
The same standard of review and evidentiary presumption for alcohol-induced intoxication cases applies to drug-induced intoxication
cases. 211
Drug-induced intoxication was added to Maryland's workers'
law in 1972 when the General Assembly compensation statute disqualified a claimant whose on the job accidental injury occurred
solely from taking a non-prescribed drug that rendered him incapa205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 4, 272 A.2d at 432.
See id. at 4-6, 272 A.2d at 431-33.
See id. at 6, 272 A.2d at 433.
Id. at 9, 272 A.2d at 434. Although Zentz has been overruled as to application
of appellate review, it remains valid on the issues of intoxication and the standard for establishing sole causation. See Turner v. State, 61 Md. App. 393, 400,
486 A.2d 804, 807 (1985) (holding that appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to accidental injuries are tried de novo).
209. See Zentz, 11 Md. App at 9-10, 272 A.2d at 434-35.
210. See MD. CODE A.."lN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(b) (1991).
211. See id. § 9-506(f) (2). Intoxication must be the sole cause of the injuries, not
merely a contributing factor. See S. Rosenbloom, Inc. v. Willingham, 190 Md.
552-58,59 A.2d 311, 313 (1948). The employer has the burden of overcoming
this statutory presumption. See Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 17,
338 A.2d 251, 260 (1975).

306

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

ble of satisfactorily performing his work. 212 The majority of states
have followed Maryland law213 and include a disqualification of benefits due to drug induced intoxication. 214
In Cam Construction Co. v. Beccio,215 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland held that a jury should have been able to hear evidence as to the claimant's taking of prescription drug medication. 216
Beccio was employed as a superintendent for a construction project
when he tripped and fell, knocking himself unconscious, while walking down an unlit hallway under construction. 217 Beccio informed
the doctor that earlier in the morning he had taken Dantrium, a
muscle relaxant, prescribed by his physician. 218 Beccio stated that
thirty minutes after he took Dantrium, he became unbalanced, fell
forward, struck his face, and lost consciousness for several
minutes. 219
The Commission awarded benefits to Beccio, holding that his
injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. However,
the Commission did not consider all of the medical reports. 220 The
employer was granted a motion for rehearing, during which the
Commission reversed its position after hearing the previously excluded Dantrium medical evidence. 221 Beccio subsequently appealed
to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which granted Beccio's motion in limine, once again excluding all of the Dantrium medical
evidence because the drug was taken in accordance with a doctor's
prescription. 222 Therefore, because the jury heard only about the
debris and darkness in the hallway where the injury occurred, they
returned a verdict in Beccio's favor. 223
The court of special appeals ended the medical evidence de212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

219.

220.
221.
222.
223.

ANN., art. 101, § 45 (Supp. 1973).
See Appendix.
See LARsON, Reg. ed., supra note 1, § 34.39, at 6-142 to 6-147; see also Appendix.
92 Md. App. 452, 608 A.2d 1264 (1992).
See id. at 464, 608 A.2d at 1270.
See id. at 453, 608 A.2d at 1264.
See id. at 454, 608 A.2d at 1265. "The Dantrium had been prescribed in 1987
to treat Beccio's life-long 'toe-walking' disorder, a condition which caused him
to walk on his toes and lean forward." Id.
See id. The side effects of Dantrium are drowsiness, dizziness, weakness and
general malaise. See id. (citing Medical Economics Data, Physician's Desk Reference, at 1619-20 (1992».
See id.
See id. at 455, 608 A.2d at 1265.
See id. at 455-56, 608 A.2d at 1265-66.
See id. at 456-59, 608 A.2d at 1266-67.
MD. CODE

2000]

"Sole" Cause in Workers' Compensation

307

bate,224 holding that, as the statute made no exception for admitting
evidence of taking prescription drugs, the employer should have
been able to introduce evidenc::e of the employee's taking Dantrium
to treat his medical condition.225 The court reasoned that even
though Beccio presented credible and well-supported testimony that
his injury was due to debris and darkness, the employer should not
be deprived of the opportunity to present suitable contradictory evidence of the employee's use of prescription medication. 226 However,
it is important to note that claiming the Dantrium was a contributing cause to the accident would not have been enough. In order to
bar compensation, the employer must prove that the prescription
medication was both not taken according to a doctor's prescription,
and that it was the sole cause of the injury.227

B. Maryland's Legislative Efforts Regarding Alcohol-and Drug-Induced
Intoxication
In 1993, controversial workers' compens'ation bills pertaining to
work-related injuries as a result of intoxication and drug abuse began to filter through the Maryland General Assembly.228 The effort
to reduce the disqualifying standard for intoxication originated with
House Bill 1353.229 The purpose of House Bill 1353 was to reduce
the standard from a "sole" cause factor to a "contributing" cause
factor. 23o The Bill was also drafted to make work environments more
comfortable and secure for the current workforce as well as the
public at large. 231 House Bill 1353 was submitted to the Economic
Matters Committee, but was subsequently defeated. 232
In 1994, the effort was repeated in modified House Bill 1374.233
The bill retained the contributing cause standard from House Bill
224. See id.
225. See id. at 464, 608 A.2d at 1270.
226. See id. (noting that there is no prescription drug exception in the statute that
excludes injuries resulting solely from the effect of drugs).
227. See id. at 466, 608 A.2d at 1270; see also Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275
Md. 1, 17, 338 A.2d 251, 260 (1975) (stating that intoxication must be the sole
cause of injury, not merely a contributing factor) ..
228. H.B. 1353, 407th Leg. (Md. 1993).
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. H.B. 1353 Bill Analysis, 407th Leg. (Md. 1993):
. 232. Vote Tally of the House Economic Matters Committee, H.B. 1353, 407th Leg.
(Md. 1993). The bill failed in committee- it was defeated by an unanimous
vote. See id.
233. H.B. 1374, 408th Leg. (Md. 1994).
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1353, but also added the sole cause factor for injuries that resulted
from the employee using drugs not taken in accordance with a physician's orders.234 Sole cause was replaced by contributing cause elsewhere in the bill for consistency, but with many new conditions precedent that an employer would have to satisfy.235 Although these
modifications seemed to have created more support for the legislation, the bill was again defeated in the Economic Matters
Committee. 236
Although in 1995 the legislation gained greater momentum, it
once again failed.237 Two separate bills originated in both houses;
House Bill 1137 in the Economic Matters Committee238 and Senate
Bill 563 in the Finance Committee.239 House Bill 1137 was rejected
by the Economic Matters Committee. 24o The Senate bill received a
favorable committee vote with amendments. 241 The previous safeguards that were added to the 1994 bill remained,242 but the "contributing" cause standard was changed to a "substantial" cause
standard. 243
The bill placed the burden of responsibility equally upon the
employer and the employee. 244 It made an employee ineligible for
workers' compensation when the injury suffered was substantially
caused by drug or alcohol use. 245 However, in order for an injured
employee to be eligible for workers' compensation, the place of employment must be a certified Drug-Free Workplace as outlined by
234. See id.
235. See id. Some of those conditions included: (1) that the employment at issue be
covered by a Drug-Free Workplace program that complied with the Governor's Commission on Drug & Alcohol Abuse and certified annually; (2) that
the intoxication or drug be detected by a test conducted in accordance with
certain established procedures; and (3) that the level of intoxication or drugs
equal to or exceed the minimum positive level established by the U.S. Department of Transportation. See id.
236. Vote Tally of the House Economic Matters Committee, H.B. 1374, 408th Leg.
(Md. 1994). The bill was defeated in committee. See id.
237. See id.
238. See H.B. 1137 (Md. 1995).
239. See S.B. 563 (Md. 1995).
240. See H.B. 1137 (Md. 1995) (noting that this bill was heard by the Economic
Matters Committee on March 13, 1995, and reported unfavorably).
241. See Senate of Maryland, Senate Financing Committee Voting Record, S.B. 563
(Md. 1995).
242. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
243. See S.B. 563 (Md. 1995).
244. See id.
245. See id.
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the Governor's Drug & Alcohol Abuse Commission. 246 In effect, the
proposed bill created an incentive for employers to implement a
Drug-Free Workplace policy, as doing so would entitle an employer
to a lower burden of proof when defending workers' compensation
claims involving drug or alcohol abuse by an employee. 247
State and local support was rising in support of the legislation. 248 In both committees and on the legislative floors, the Governor's office explained that the bill would inevitably "discourage the
use of alcohol and other drugs in the workplace. "249 Also, executives
from hazardous occupational industries testified that although "significant money [is spent] on training, equipment inspections and
supervisory efforts ... an act of irresponsibility and poor judgment,
such as the use of drugs or alcohol while working, cannot always be
controlled by even the most vigilant employers."25o The increased
support from various industries enabled the controversial bill to
pass in the Senate. 251 However, the legislation failed in the House
Economic Matters Committee. 252
In 1996, the General Assembly again revisited the issue, looking
at two predecessor bills: House Bill 788 253 and Senate Bill 491. 254
Sponsorship within the Senate Finance Committee for Senate Bill
491 rose from one to four sponsors,255 and again received a
favorable committee report with amendments. 256 The first amendment altered the title of the bill to reflect its emphasis on the em246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judith A. Green, Program Director, Drug-Free
Workplace Initiative (Feb. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Green Memo] (on file with
author); Letter from M. Beth Conte, Deputy Director, Maryland Delaware
Solid Waste Association, to The Honorable Thomas L. Bromwell, Chairman
Senate Finance Committee (Feb. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Conte Letter] (on file
with author); Letter from Dawn C. Holibonich, President, Maryland Healthcare Human Resources Association, to Chairman and Members of the Committee (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Holibonich Letter] (on file with author).
249. Green Memo, supra note 248, at 2.
250. Conte Letter, supra note 248.
251. See Senate of Maryland, Senate Floor Voting Record, S.B. 563 (Md. 1995) (noting that the bill passed with 44 yeas and 1 nay).
252. See House Economic Matters Committee, Vote Tally, S.B. 563 (Md. 1995) (reporting that the bill failed with 4 yeas, 16 nays, with 2 absent votes).
253. See H.B. 788 (Md. 1996).
254. See S.B. 491 (Md. 1996).
255. See id.
256. See id.
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ployer, instead of the employee. 257 The title was changed from
"Workers' Compensation - Use of Drugs or Alcohol"258 to "Workers' Compensation - Drug-Free Workplace Program - Use of
Drugs or Alcohol. "259 A second amendment lowered the standard of
review from substantial cause 260 to proximate cause. 261 Proximate
cause was defined as "the cause that is first in importance and but
for which an injury . . . would not have occurred. "262 The third
amendment requested that the Workers' Compensation Commission
report to the General Assembly by October 1, 1999, regarding the
number of workers' compensation cases where benefits were denied, as well as tally the number of drug-free workplace programs
that were certified. 263 However, once again, this legislation, although
adopted by the Senate,264 was rejected by the House Economic Matters Committee and thus failed. 265
The bill's failure was due to labor unions'266 staunch opposition
to the second amendment's alteration, which lowered the standard
of proof to sole cause. 267 Representatives .on behalf of the labor unions insisted that the proposed change would create bad public policy for several reasons. The overarching concern was that this legislation would begin the process of whittling away the foundation of
257. See S.B. 491 (Md. 1996).
258. S.B. 563 (Md. 1995).
259. S.B. 491 (Md. 1996). Heavy emphasis was placed on the nation's drug problem and on the need for and positive outcomes from instilling the Drug-Free
Workplace program. See Lucky & Bok, supra note 2, at 1. Parallel legislation in
six other states:· Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington
was also referenced. See id. Each of these states received widespread support
by enacting the Drug-Free Workplace program, as well as for witnessing a dramatic impact on reducing workers' compensation claims and related expenses. See id. at 2.
260. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
261. See S.B. 491 (Md. 1996). There was also a photocopied page of Black's Dictionary with the definition "proximate cause" attached to the bill. See id.
262. [d.
263. See id.
264. Vote Tally of the Senate Floor, S.B. 491, 410th Leg. (Md. 1996).
265. Vote Tally of the House Economic Matters Comm., H.B. 788, 410th Leg. (Md.
1996) .
266. The labor unions consisted of the Maryland State and District of Columbia
AFL-CIO and the Maryland division of the American Federation of County
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). See infra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
267. Interview with Senator Mike Busch, Chairman of the House Economic Matters
Comm., in Annapolis, Md. (October 12, 1988).
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the workers' compensation system-the no-fault aspect. 268 They
claimed that the bill placed an unfair burden on the employee
when the onus should, instead, have been on the employer to assure a drug-free workplace. 269
The labor unions further claimed that, as a result of compensation risks becoming more affordable, the caseload would inevitably
increase, resulting in delays throughout the system. 270 Also, more
employers would seek to take advantage of the new standard of
proof. 271 The proposed change would create an incentive for employers to view all accidents as probable cause for suspicion of substance abuse. 272 Many workplace accident victims would become suspects, adding insult to their injury.273 While the labor unions
believed that workplace safety was a worthwhile goal, they would not
support a measure that was bad public policy for what they claimed
contradicted with the nature of the workers' compensation
system. 274
In 1997, the legislation resurfaced as House Bill 736 and Senate
Bill 668.275 Within the Senate Finance Committee, sponsorship again
increased from four to eleven, including the committee chair. 276
Senate Bill 668 received a favorable committee report with amendments.277 The first amendment reverted the title of the bill to its
1995 reading, "Workers' Compensation - Use of Controlled Dangerous Substances or Alcohol," de-emphasizing the Drug-Free Workplace initiative. 278 In addition, the standard was altered from proximate cause to the more stringent standard of primary cause. 279
Primary cause was defined as "the cause that is first in importance."280 Finally, the existing presumption was also modified to be
268. Worker.s' Compensation - Use of Controlled Dangerous Substances or Alcohol: Hearing
on H.B. 788 Before the House Economic Matters Comm., 410th Leg. (Md.
1996) (statement of Ray McInerney, Representative, AFSCME).
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See supra note 268.
275. H.B. 736 and S.B. 668, 411th Leg. (Md. 1997).
276. See S.B. 668, 411th Leg. (Md. 1997). The 1997 Senate Finance Committee
Chair was Tom Bromwell. See supra note 248.
277. See id.
278. [d. at 1.
279. See id. at 2.
280. See id.
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consistent with the modification on the defense itself. 281 This
amendment provided that "absent substantial evidence to the contrary, a presumption that ... the effect on the covered employee of
a controlled dangerous substance . . . [or] the intoxication of the
covered employee [will be held as] not the primary cause of the accidental personal injury .... "282
In an effort to quell the labor unions opposition and to muster
support for passage, the Governor's Drug & Alcohol Abuse Commission promoted the bill as "compromise legislation" and pointed out
that alcohol and drug free workplaces were beneficial to all parties.283 Emphasis was placed on employees who had legitimate abuse
problems in an effort to de-emphasize the fact that profits were increasing for insurance companies. 284 The unions suggested that any
savings from an alcohol and drug-free workplace program should
be placed in a fund to be used to assist employees. 285 However, this
would leave the employer with no economic benefit for having installed a Drug-Free Workplace program. 286
Supporters from various industries turned out in large numbers
at the legislative hearings to express their views. 287 The legislation
281. See id.
282. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
283. Workers' Compensation - Use of Drugs or Alcohol: Hearing on S.B. 668 Before Senate
Finance Comm., 41lth Leg. (Md. 1997) (statement of Judith Green, Program
Director, Drug-Free Workplace Initiative, Governor's Drug & Alcohol Abuse
Commission) .
284. See id.
285. Workers' Compensation - Use of Controlled Dangerous Substances or Alcohol: Hearing
on S.B. 668 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 41lth Leg. (Md. 1997) (statement
of Primo Padeletti, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO).
286. Workers' Compensation Benefit and Insurance Oversight Committee- Report
of the 1995 Interim, 411th Leg. (Md. 1995).
287. The telecommunications industry adamantly supported this bill, emphasizingtheir intolerance for drugs and alcohol on job sites. See Workers' Compensation Use of Controlled Dangerous Substances or Alcohol: Hearing on S.B. 668 Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 411th Leg. (Md. 1997) (statement of F. Ray Weems, President, Southern Maryland Cable, Inc.) (asserting that, although the bill would
not significantly save money for business, it would provide more aid for the
thousands of families suffering from the actions of alcohol and drug abusers
everyday). See id. Additionally, management representatives from the construction industry illustrated the assistance this measure would provide to the State
in protecting its most valuable resource, employees. See id. (statement of Mary
E. Easto, Comptroller, Henry H. Lewis Contractors, Inc.). The construction
industry also argued that people who chose to endanger the lives of others by
partaking in drugs or alcohol should not be rewarded with compensation. See
id. Other written testimony submitted from the construction industry in-
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carried considerable support, again passing on the Senate floor,288
as well as a sentiment that "a vote against this bill would be to endorse irresponsible, life-threatening behavior."289 However, it failed
to pass the House before the legislative session ended. 290
Mter five years, the impetus for change was House Bill 373 and
Senate Bill 36. 291 Senate Finance Committee Chairman, Tom
Bromwell, did not hold a hearing on the corresponding Senate legislation, recalling that his committee passed a similar bill unanimously the previous year. 292 In addition, the Maryland Chamber of
Commerce balked at the idea of watching this legislation be killed
or overhauled again within the House Economic Matters Committee. 293 Thus, the Chamber of Commerce broke the stalemate over
the legislation by rounding up seventy-six co-sponsors of the bill in
the House. 294 This was enough votes to assure final passage, exactly
five more than the bill needed to gain approval in the House. 295 In
effect, the bill was passed before its opponents were given a chance
to protest. 296 The bill overwhelmingly passed both houses. 297
Senate Bill 36 is now codified in section 9-506 of Chapter 108

288.
289.

290.
291.
292.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

cluded: Precision Products Group, Inc. - Stone Industrial Division; Hopkins &
Wayson, Inc., Building Contractors; L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc.; and, the Maryland Builders Association, representing more than 2400 member firms. See id.
(hearing attendance record). Furthermore, employers should not suffer increased insurance rates to pay employees whose inebriation contributed to a
workplace accident. See id. (statement of Fred Teeter, Jr., Chamber Executive,
Chamber of Commerce Hagerstown-Washington County). Other Chambers of
Commerce in support of Senate Bill 668 included: Maryland Chamber; Carroll County Chamber; and Queen Anne's County Chamber. See id. (hearing attendance record).
Vote Tally of the Senate Floor, S.B. 668, 41lth Leg. (Md. 1997).
Letter from Fred Teeter, Jr., Chamber Executive, Chamber of Commerce of
Hagerstown-Washington County to Thomas L. Bromwell, Chairman, Senate Finance Comm. (Mar. 5, 1997) (on file with Senator Thomas L. Bromwell).
Vote Tally of the House Floor, H.B. 736, 411th Leg., (Md. 1997).
H.B. 372 and S.B. 36, 412th Leg. (Md. 1998).
See Tom Johnson, Maryland Chamber Goes on Offensive in Support of Workers'
Comp Bil~ DAILY RECORD, 3 A (February 28, 1998).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Vote Tally of the House Floor, H.B. 372, 412th Leg. (Md. 1998); Vote Tally
of the Senate Floor, S.B. 36, 412th Leg. (Md. 1998). The bill passed with a
House vote of 87 yeas to 44 nays. Vote Tally of House Floor, H.B. 372, 4112th
Leg. (Md. 1998).
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of the Labor and Employment Article. 29B Under section 9-506, a
claimant whose job-related injury was caused "primarily" by drug or
alcohol intoxication will be denied certain benefits. 299 Under this
standard, all benefits, except for medical treatment, are denied to a
covered employee if: (1) the primary cause of an accidental personal
injury is either the intoxication of the employee while on duty,3°O or
the effect on the employee of a controlled dangerous substance;301
and (2) the use of the substance was not in accordance with a prescription from a physician. 302 With the statutory presumption, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the effect of the alcohol
or the controlled dangerous substance was the "primary" cause of
the accident. 303
In effect, despite the labor unions' and the trial lawyers' vociferous opposition, the passage of this bill did not change the essence
of Maryland's workers' compensation law. 304 Workers are still entitled to medical benefits305 and the burden of proof remains with the

298.
299.
300.
301.

302.
303.
304.

305.

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (Supp. 1999).
[d. § 9-506(d).
See id. § 9-506 (d) (3).
See id. § 9-506(d)(2) (i). The controlled dangerous substances covered in this
Act are defined and listed in section 277 or 279 of Article 27 of the Maryland
Code. See id.
See id. § 9-506(d) (2) (ii).
See id. § 9-506(g).
Interview with Senator Tom Bromwell, Maryland General Assembly, in Annapolis, Md. (April 8, 1999). However, what seemed to be a quite significant part
of the bill in years past, the Drug-Free Workplace program, was deleted from
the new law altogether. See id. There is no mention of the requirement that
businesses must be certified annually to qualify for the prohibition in section
9-506 of the Maryland Code. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (Supp.
1999). The Drug-Free Workplace initiative, in previous years, had been added
by the pressures of union leaders and Maryland trial lawyers. See Interview
with Senator Tom Bromwell, Maryland General Assembly, in Annapolis, Md.
(April 8, 1999). Union leaders were concerned that workers should not be denied benefits for any reason, especially as they were already denied benefits
for self-inflicted injuries. See S.B. 36 Bill File. Maryland trial lawyers were concerned that this law could signal a change in the compensation process from
a no-fault system to a contributory tort system. See id. However, this opposition
was countered by the overarching principle that it was absurd to award people
compensation as a result of their own irresponsible, and in some cases illegal,
behavior. See id. As such, the 1997 law was deemed unsatisfactory for the business climate in that it made a mockery of the valid and commendable justifications for having a workers' compensation system. See id.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(d) (Supp. 1999).
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employer. 306 The presumption continues to serve the employee's interest, as the court presumes that the injury was not abuse related,
until substantially proven otherwise. 307 The no-fault system still remains intact, except that now not all intoxication related workplace
injuries are compensable under the law; rather, the no-fault system
recognizes that substance abuse related accidents are a logical
exception. 30B
VI. PROPOSED EFFECTS AND POSSIBLE ISSUES STEMMING
FROM SECTION 9-506 OF THE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARTICLE OF THE MARYLAND ANNOTATED CODE
Financially, section 9-506 is not anticipated to have a major impact on the workers' compensation industry.309 The State, as an employer, is expected to have a minimal decrease in expenditures due
to the decline in the number of workers' compensation claims and
reduced benefits. 310 Local governments and small businesses are also
expected to have a minimal decrease in expenditures to the extent
that local governments, as employers, pay less workers' compensation claims or premiums. 311
In addition, the Workers' Compensation Commission is required to hear more disputes over whether alcohol or drug abuse
caused the on-thejob accident. 312 Having a lesser burden to prove,
employers will be more likely to raise the defense of intoxication. 313
Thus, with a greater number of employers challenging workers'
compensation claims, the case dockets of the Workers' Compensa306. See id. at § 9-S06(g).
307. [d.
308. See text accompanying supra note 272; see also infra Part VI and accompanying
notes for an analysis of differing states' handling of the intoxication statute.
309. See S.B. Fiscal Note No. 36412, at 1 (1998). A Fiscal Note is required to be attached to all newly passed legislation in order to assess the fiscal impact of
the bill. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T. § 2-1S0S(a) (1), (e) (1998).
310. See S.B. Fiscal Note No. 36412, at 1. Revenues would not be affected. See id.
The average workers' compensation claim cost is approximately $21,000, including medical services and treatment. See id. However, the Injured Workers'
Insurance Fund reports that alcohol and drug related claims tend to be more
than twice as high as the average claim, or approximately $SO,OOO per claim.
See id. Assuming that $10,000 must still be spent for medical services and treatment, workers' compensation costs would be reduced by $40,000 per claim.
See id.
311. See id. Revenues would not be affected. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
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tion Commission and, consequently, the appellate courts, is expected to increase. 314
At its core, section 9-506 leaves open to interpretation certain
issues not addressed in the statute or elsewhere in the Code. In order to' examine the issues and determinations facing Maryland
courts, it is helpful to review statutes and case law of other states
that use the same primary cause or related standard. Only Florida
employs the primary cause standard, recently enacted by Maryland.315 Five other states use highly analogous standards of review:
Arkansas,316 Iowa,317 Oklahoma,3IB Utah,319 and Texas. 32o Thus, Florida's statute and subsequent case law, as well as the five other states,
may provide insight on how Maryland's case law may develop.

A.

Primary Cause

The General Assembly has defined primary as "first in importance, "321 but beyond that, the standard remains unclear. The courts
can either maintain the heavily burdensome requirement of sole
cause or relax the burden of proof permitting a proximate causal
connection to satisfy the standard.
Under Florida law, disability or death due to the accidental acceleration or aggravation of a disease from habitual use of alcohol,
controlled substances, or narcotic drugs is not an injury arising out
of employment. 322 Using language similar to Maryland's law, the
statute denies compensation if the injury was "occasioned primarily"
314. See id.
315. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West Supp. 1999) (barring compensation if
the injury is caused primarily by the employee's intoxication).
316. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5) (B) (iv) (Michie Supp. 1997) (excluding from
"compensable injury" those injuries "substantially occasioned" by the use of
alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of doctor's
orders).
317. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16(2) (West 1996) (barring compensation for injuries
substantially caused by employee's intoxication).
318. See OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11(A)(3) (West Supp. 1999) (excepting from
workers' compensation injuries directly resulting from use or abuse of alcohol
or drugs).
319. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302 (1997) (barring compensation for injuries in
which a major contributing cause was use of illegal substances, intentional
abuse of prescription drugs or intoxication from alcohol).
320. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032 (West 1996) (stating an insurance carrier is
not liable for compensation if the injury occurred while the employee was in
a state of intoxication).
321. See MD. CODE ANN .. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(d)(l) (1999).
322. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West Supp. 1999).
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by the intoxication of the employee or by the influence of any
drugs or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician. 323 However,
there are many provisions included in Florida's law that are not addressed by Maryland. In Florida, if the employee has a blood alcohol level above a certain percentage or has a positive confirmation
of drugs, it is presumed that the injury was occasioned primarily by
intoxication or drugs. 324 This is unlike Maryland, which gives greater
deference to the employee. 325 This blood-alcohol percentage presumption is meant to shield an employer from the inequities of having to pay compensation to a claimant, with the requisite blood alcohol level, where the originating cause of the accident is
questionable. 326
1.

Florida's Experience

The intoxication defense originated in the Florida Legislature
in 1935.327 Four years later, in Zee v. Gary,328 the Supreme Court of
Florida construed the primary cause standard following the legislature's intent. 329 The court began with the basic rule of statutory construction-when determining intent, words and phrases must be
read in conjunction with the entire statute, not just within a single
section. 330 Originally, the law provided a presumption that the employee's injury was not occasioned primarily by intoxication. 33 ! "Pri323. See id.
324. See id. § 440.09 (7) (b). The blood-alcohol level required to create a presumption that the injury was occasioned primarily by intoxication is 0.10 or higher.
See FlA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (West Supp. 1999).
325. See id. 89-506(g) (stating that, without evidence to the contrary, a presumption
exists that the effect of controlled substance or intoxication of the employee
was not the primary cause of the irtiury).
326. See Orlando Waste Paper Co. v. Meadows, 460 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) "(Smith, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Smith explained that it was erroneous for the court not to follow this purpose
of Florida's Workmen's Compensation Statute in the case sub judice because
there was direct evidence establishing the cause of the accident. See id. at 437
(citing C.A. Meyer Paring & Constr. v. McFalls, 453 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1984)." See also C.A. Meyer Paving and Constr., 453 So. 2d 914 (finding
that there was not enough evidence to rebut the presumption). But see
Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1981) (holding that "marginal" cases should be weighed in favor of claimant).
327. See 1935 Fla. Laws ch. 17481-8c.
328. 189 So. 34 (Fla. 1939).
329. See id. at 36-37.
330. See id. at 36.
331. See id. at 37. That presumption has since been altered in favor of the em-
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marily" was defined as "originally," "in the first place," and
" chiefly. "332 "Intoxication" was defined as "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to lose the normal control
of one's bodily and mental faculties."333 Thus, by interpreting these
defined terms as they relate to the presumptions in favor of the em·
ployee, and viewing it within the entire Act, the court concluded
that "primary" cause meant that in order "for intoxication to bar
recovery, it must be the proximate cause of the injury without
which the accident would not have occurred."334
In Zee, the claimant was awarded compensation based on the
construction of the word "primary."335 There, the claimant, a
painter, was working on a swinging scaffold on the side of a build·
. ing. 336 While working, the claimant jumped upon the scaffold to en·
sure its security.337 Mter resuming work, the claimant walked along
the scaffold, knocked into the guard rail, which broke, causing him
to fall to his death. 338 The employer denied liability on the ground
that intoxication caused the death of the claimant. 339 The employer
supplied testimony that the deceased consumed whiskey throughout
the day; however, no one could attest to a precise amount, and the
testifying physician could only state that the death resulted from the
fall. 340
The court noted that the claimant was still functioning alertly
and performing as usual in the course of his employment. 341 Also,
witnesses stated that the strength of the guard rail should have pr~
tected the employee from falling even if he was intoxicated. 342
Therefore, the court held that the primary cause of injury was the
breaking of the guard rail and that the intoxication could have

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

ployer when drug or alcohol testing produces a positive confirmation of the
employee's intoxication or when an employee refuses to submit to a drug or
alcohol test. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b), (c) (West Supp. 1999); see also
infra notes 388-461 and accompanying text.
Zee v. Gary, 189 So. 34, 36 (Fla. 1939) (citation omitted).
Jd.(citing 2 WORDS AND PHRASES, Second Series, 1175).
[d. at 36-37.
[d. at 38.
See id. at 35.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 35, 37.
See id. at 37.
See id.
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been at most a remote cause. 343 Furthermore, the court stated that
although there was a possibility the employee's intoxication could
have been a contributing factor to the injury, the employer must
prove that the intoxication was the primary factor. 344
The exact evidentiary determinations between contributing
cause and primary cause became less crucial after the Florida Legislature provided employers with alcohol and drug testing procedures.
when an employee sustained a work related injury.345 If a blood alcohol level of .08 or more was found in the employee's system at
the time of injury, then the burden shifted to the employee to
prove by substantial evidence that the intoxication was not the primary cause of injury.346 Mter the drug tests were admitted, the court
would conduct an inquiry to determine if the employee presented
substantial evidence in contradiction to the blood-alcohol test
results. 347
2.

Similarly Worded Statutes

Similar to the Maryland General Assembly, the Arkansas Legislature recently amended its intoxication defense statute with respect
to workers' compensation. 348 In Arkansas, an employee who incurs a
workplace injury is not entitled to receive workers' compensation
benefits if the injury was "substantially occasioned" by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs without a doctor's orders. 349 During the early part of the 1980s, Arkansas decreased its
standard from sole cause to substantial cause. 350 By replacing the
word "sole" with "substantial," this portion of the applicability provision replicates Maryland law. 351
In Arkansas, the presence of intoxicants creates a rebuttable
presumption that the injury was substantially occasioned by the use
of intoxicants. 352 In 1993, Arkansas repealed its presumption in favor
343. See id. at 38.
344. See id. The court noted that Florida law does not provide for contributory negligence as a bar to compensation. See id.
345. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (a)-(d) (West Supp. 1999).
346. See id. § 440.09(7)(b).
347. See id.
348. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4) (B) (iv) (a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
349. See id.
350. See id. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv)(a), (b).
351. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
352. See § 11-9-102(5) (B) (iv) (b); Weaver v. Whitaker Furniture Co., 935 S.W.2d 584,
585 (Ark. App. 1996) (explicating the revised rule). In Weaver, the court
found that illegal drugs were present in the claimant's urine and that the
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of employees, replacing it with an employer favored presumption. 353
Arkansas's new presumption runs contrary to Maryland's, which
places the burden on the employer to prove that the employee's injury was primarily caused by intoxicants. 354
Similarly, Iowa has enacted an intoxication defense statute that
denies an employee compensation if intoxication was a "substantial"
factor in causing the injury.355 However, Iowa's intoxication defense,
unlike Arkansas and a m.yority of states, is encompassed under the
defense of willful misconduct; intoxication is not a separate defense,
but part of the general defense of willful misconduct. 356
Iowa, like Maryland, contemplated and altered its burden of
proof. 357 However, where Maryland decreased its burden on employers,358 Iowa moved in the other direction by increasing the employer's burden of proof. 359 Iowa went from requiring the employer
to prove intoxication was the proximate cause,360 to the more strin-

353.
354.
355.

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

claimant did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that
the injury occurred because of illegal drug consumption. See id. at 587.
See Weaver, 935 S.W.2d at 585 (noting the shift in the presumption).
See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16(2) (West 1996). Note, however, that Iowa's law expressly delineates drugs not prescribed by an authorized physician, and answers what happens if the intoxication was substantially caused by prescription
drugs not taken in accordance with a physician's orders. See id. Likewise, statutes in Maryland, Florida, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas, all include such a
provision. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4) (B) (iv) (a) (Michie Supp. 1997)
(excluding injury "substantially occasioned by ... prescription drugs used in
contravention of physician's orders ... "); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West
1991) (excluding injury "occasioned primarily by . . . the influence of any
drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician . . . ");
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506 (d) (2) (ii) (1999) (noting that compensation would not be denied "if the controlled dangerous substance was administered, taken, or used in accordance with the prescription of a physician ... ");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (A) (3) (West Supp. 1999) (excluding from coverage injury "resulting directly from the ... abuse of prescription drugs ... ");
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.013 (b) (1) (West 1996) (noting that intoxication
does not include "the introduction into the body of a substance taken under
and in accordance with a prescription written for the employee by the employee's doctor").
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16 (West 1996); see also supra Part III (discussing willful employee misconduct).
See supra notes 244-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.16(2).
See id. See, e.g., Farmers Elevator Co. v. Manning, 286 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Iowa
1979) (applying a burden of proof whereby the employee's i~ury is not com-
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gent standard of proving the intoxication was a substantial factor in
causing the injury.361
In comparison, in Oklahoma where the burden on the employer is lower, an employer will not be subject to liability if an employee sustains "[a]n injury resulting directly from the use or abuse
of alcohol, illegal drugs or chemicals, or the abuse of prescription
drugs .... "362 However, the statute limits the application of the employer's defense of intoxication, allowing it to apply only if the intoxication rendered the employee unable to reason and act like an
ordinary prudent person at the time of the accident. 363 Furthermore, Oklahoma's statute mandates the admission into evidence of
post-accident alcohol or drug. testing results for the purpose of establishing intoxication. 364
Prior to 1987, Oklahoma courts interpreted their intoxication
defense statute as mandating that the intoxication must have been
the sole and direct cause of the injury.365 However, in Birdsell v. Phillips Petroleum CO.,366 the sole and direct construction given to
Oklahoma's intoxication defense statute was altered to a more lenient direct cause standard in an effort to better reflect the intent of
the Legislature. 367 In Birdsell, the claimant attempted to take advanpensable if intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury).
361. See id.; see, e.g., 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995) (applying a burden of proof whereby the employee's injury is not compensable if
intoxication was a substantial cause of the injury).
362. OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 11 (A) (3) (West Supp. 1999).
363. See id. It is interesting to note that neither Maryland nor Florida connected
their statutes to the reasonably prudent person standard; instead, they enacted presumptions in favor of either the employee or employer. See supra
notes 325 and 334 and accompanying text.
364. See OKLA. STATE ANN. tit. 85, § 11(A)(3). This provision provides the extent of
Oklahoma's procedural considerations when invoking the intoxication defense
statute. See id.
365. See Barna Transp. v. Goffe, 732 P.2d 483,484-85 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) ("An injured employee may not recover workers' compensation for an injury that results directly and solely from his voluntary intoxication" (citing 85 O.S.1991 §
11; 85 O.S.1981 § 27 (repealed 1986»). The court in Barna construed section
11 in conjunction with section 27 to reach the "sole and direct" cause requirement. See id.; see also Birdsell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 910 P.2d 1097,
1098 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (examining Oklahoma's statutory intoxication
standard after the legislature repealed section 27 to eliminate the "sole" cause
requirement) .
366. 910 P.2d 1097 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
367. See id. at 1098. The court noted that the Legislature explicitly repealed section
27 and enacted no replacement provision, thereby eliminating the "sole"
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tage of the earlier construction given by the court to Oklahoma's
intoxication defense statute. 368 Nonetheless, the court rejected the
claimant's argument and affirmed the denial of compensation. 369
The court found that both fatigue and intoxication were direct factors in Birdsell's death.370 However, the court noted that the language of the statute now precluded compensation if intoxication
was simply a direct cause.371 Therefore, where medical evidence
proved that intoxication was one of the direct causes, the claimant
was barred from recovery.372
In Utah, an employee's claim for disability compensation will
be reduced by fifteen percent if the "major contributing cause" of
the employee's injury is alcohol use, illegal drug use, or medications
not taken in accordance with a prescription. 373 Utah's statute sets
the intoxication limit for alcohol consumption to "a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater . . . . "374
Under Texas law, employers are not liable for injuries that occur while the employee was "in a state of intoxication."375 Texas law
defines intoxication as having a blood alcohol concentration of .10
cause requirement. See id.
See id. at 1098-99.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1099.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1099; see also Thorton v. Troublefield, 649 P.2d 538, 54041 (Okla.
1982) (following a "direct" cause approach to an employer's claim that its employee was inebriated at the time of injury).
373. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302(2) (b) (Supp. 1999); see also Lopez v. Kaiser Steel
Corp., 660 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1983) (acknowledging that it was a statutory
mandate to reduce an employee's claim for compensation by 15 percent
where the employee was intoxicated). Within section 34A-2-302(2)(b) of the
statute, disability compensation is expressly excluded; as a result, it is unclear
as to whether a claimant may still be awarded "medical" benefits if the cause
of injury is due to intoxicants. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302(b) (Supp.
1999).
374. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302(2) (b) (iii) (Supp. 1999). "Chemical test" mayor
may not exclude certain types of testing procedures. Id. at § 34A-2-302(3) (a).
375. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.032(1) (A) (West 1996); see March v. Victoria Lloyds
Ins. Co., 773 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. 1989) (maintaining that" [u]nder the
Workers' Compensation Act, injuries received while in a state of intoxication
are not considered 'injuries sustained in the course of employment' "); Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Silas, 631 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. 1982) (grappling with
the proper interpretation to be given to "intoxication"); Smith v. Traders &
General Ins. Co., 258 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1953) (reiterating "that an injury
received while in the state of intoxication is not an injury sustained in the
course of employment").

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
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or more. 376 Intoxication also includes situations where the employee
does "not havre] the normal use of mental or physical faculties resulting from the voluntary introduction into the body of an alcoholic beverage ... , a controlled substance ... , a dangerous drug .
. , an abusable glue or aerosol paint ... , or any similar substance
"377

Through this cursory review of various state's intoxication defenses, it appears that Maryland courts will find it necessary to elaborate on what precisely constitutes a "primary cause"378 of an injury.379 For example, Maryland could follow Florida, and discourage
habitual drug and alcohol use in the workplace, by barring compensation if an intoxicated-related injury occurs in the workplace. 38o In
addition, Maryland courts can examine case law from other states
interpreting the word "primary" as it is used in similar statutes. 381 At
its most basic level, the term "primary" would seem to require that
the intoxication be more than a contributing factor to the
accident. 382
Maryland courts will need to carefully examine the presentation
of evidence via the employee's own testimony (if available), other
employees' testimony, the employer's or supervisor's testimony, and
any medical or coroner opinions relating to the cause of the injury
or death. 383 To aid Maryland courts in deciphering this testimony,
reference to the case law of other states, which have established certain benchmark blood-alcohol content levels that give rise to a presumption of employee intoxication, also warrant consideration. 384

B.

Substantial Burden

The first issue is whether Maryland courts should accept a certain baseline blood-alcohol level to give rise to a presumption of intoxication. Currently, a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent
creates a presumption that the person's driving ability is impaired. 385
376. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.013 (a) (2) (West Supp. 2000).
377. Id. The definition specifically excludes medications prescribed by a physician
and taken in accordance with the instructions and also excludes the inhalation of glues and paints that is incidental to the employee's work. Id.
378. See supra note 298.
379. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 329, 332 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 161-209 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 324-39 and accompanying text.
385. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 11-127.1(a) (1999).
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Additionally, Maryland courts have held that "at 0.15%, intoxication
is presumed. "386
Second, under Maryland's current statute, absent "substantial
evidence" to the contrary, a presumption exists that the injury was
not primarily caused by drug or alcohol intoxication. 387 Therefore,
as a subsidiary issue, if intoxication is presumed to be a cause of the
on-the-job injury, a question arises as to how that presumption
should be rebutted.
There is a series of cases in Florida in which, after the employer met its burden by proving that the employee w;;ts primarily
intoxicated, it shifted to the employee to prove that, even though
he may have appeared to be intoxicated, his injury was substantially
caused by a superseding factor. 388 The following four cases are workers' compensation cases in which the employee failed to rebut by
substantial evidence the presumption of intoxication. 389 These cases
are instructive as to the variety of factual scenarios that Maryland
courts may face in reviewing what types of employee offered evidence do not survive judicial scrutiny.
In Sterling v. Mike Brown, Inc.,39o test results were not an issue
where, even without the blood-alcohol percentage presumption,
Sterling's intoxication was found to have primarily caused his injuries. 391 The claimant, Sterling, was employed as an air conditioning
mechanic at Mike Brown, Inc., an air conditioning company.392 Sterling arrived around 1:30 p.m. at a joint company Christmas party,
hosted partially by Mike Brown, Inc. 393 About an hour and a half
later, Brown and another employee took Sterling's car keys away
386.
387.
388.
389.

390.
391.
392.
393.

Karns v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 275 Md. 1, 5, 338 A.2d 251, 254 (1975).
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(g) (Supp. 1998).
See infra note 421 and accompanying text.
See Sterling v. Mike Brown, Inc., 580 So. 2d 832, 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming a decision denying recovery to an employee where the employee
was involved in an intoxicated brawl); Avalos v. Williford Farms, Inc., 561 So.
2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an employee who was
denied benefits had presented insufficient evidence to overcome Florida's presumption of intoxication); Orlando Waste Paper Co. v. Meadows, 460 So. 2d.
434, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that there was insufficient evidence presented to rebut the presumption of intoxication), cert. denied, 469
So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985); C.A. Meyer Paving & Constr. v. McFalls, 453 So. 2d 912,
913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
580 So. 2d 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
See id. at 835.
See id. at 834.
See id. The party had just begun at 1:00 p.m. See id.
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from him because they believed Sterling was too drunk to drive
home. 394 The party began to disperse at about 7:00 p.m. when a coworker of Sterling's offered to drive him home. 395 Sterling, becoming angry, shoved his co-worker in the chest. 396 His co-worker then
punched Sterling in the face. 397 Sterling's head hit the floor, resulting in serious permanent injuries. 398
Sterling argued that he was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits because his injury was caused, not by his intoxication, but
by his co-worker's punch to the face. 399 However, both the trial
court and the appellate court ruled against Sterling, after finding
that there was sufficient evidence in the record proving otherwise. 400
One co-worker testified that "Sterling drank between thirteen and
fifteen eight-ounce cups of beer ... between ... 1:00 and 3:00 or
4:00 p.m. "401 Within those few hours Sterling exhibited crazed behavior: screaming and raving when his keys were taken from him,
tearing his shirt off, and tearing the pockets off of his co-workers'
shirts.402 From 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., Sterling tapered off the drinking, yet his irrational behavior and slurred speech continued. 403
There was also evidence presented that when Sterling got drunk, he
was susceptible to becoming aggressive. 404
Thus, because of the uncontroverted evidence on the record
regarding Sterling'S furious behavior, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's holding that Sterling'S injury was caused primarily
by his own intoxication. 405 Although Sterling offered another cause
for his injury-the co-employee's blow to his face-he could not
prove his theory by substantial evidence. 406 The court noted there
was no evidence presented that a "completely sober man could have
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

405.
406.

See iii.
See iii.
See id.
See iii.
See iii.
See iii. at 835-36 (concluding that it was reasonable for the trial judge to determine that but for Sterling's intoxication and confrontation, the assault would
not have taken place).
See iii.
Id. at 835.
See iii.
See iii. at 835-36.
See id. at 836.
See iii. The dissenting opinion stressed the substantial weight of the evidence
and the application of controlling law. See id. at 837 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
See id. at 836.
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suffered the same accident. "407 The court concluded that, "[0] n
th[e] record, it was reasonable for the judge to conclude that, but
for Sterling's intoxicated confrontation with [his co-worker], the assault would not have taken place. "408
In Avalos v. Williford Farms, Inc.,4® a Florida appellate court entered the same verdict when presented with a case that was strikingly similar to Sterling. 410 Avalos was employed by and lived on Williford Farms.411 One evening at the farm, while off duty, a coworker, Javier, had a few drinks and fired a couple of shots from his
gun. 412 Becoming annoyed from the gun shots, Avalos, who had also
been drinking, confronted Javier at his living quarters. 413 A brawl
ensued from which Avalos was injured. 414 There were varying stories
from both parties and witnesses as to the actual physical provocation and as to what fighting occurred thereafter. 415 The trial judge
found no credible testimony and held that the claim was not compensable. 416 The judge reasoned that, but for the claimant's intoxication, the brawl with the co-worker would not have occurred. 417 As
in Sterling, the employee was unable to overcome the presumption
that his injuries were primarily caused by his intoxication. 418 Furthermore, Avalos, like Sterling, could not prove "that a 'completely
sober man could have suffered the accident' that [he] suffered."419
In Florida, scientific tests raise the presumption that the claimant was intoxicated beyond the allowable limit prescribed by stat407.
408.
409.
410.

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
Id.
561 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
See id. at 1345-46; Sterling, 580 So. 2d at 833-34; Hopkins v. Diversified Steel
Servs., 452 So. 2d 144, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that claimant
was not entitled to compensation because "his i~uries were [caused] primarily by his intoxication or because he was the aggressor in a fight").
See Avalos, 561 So. 2d at 1345.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. Avalos testified that, after he asked Javier to stop because the gun shots
woke his children, Javier attacked him with the butt of his gun. See id. Conversely, Avalos's girlfriend testified that only one of the three children was
awake. See id. Javier testified that he struck Avalos in self-defense only after
Avalos tried to hit him. See id.
See id. at 1346.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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ute. 420 Once the results of a blood-alcohol test raise the presumption of intoxication, the employee can rebut the presumption. 421
In a case interpreting these provisions, Orlando Waste Paper Co.
v. Meadows,422 the appellate court reversed the commissioner's determination that the claimant presented substantial evidence to overcome positive blood-alcohol test results that normally warranted a
presumption of intoxication at the time of injury.423 The claimant,
Meadows, worked on a loading dock for employer, Orlando Waste
Paper Company.424 One day, as Meadows was operating a fork lift,
he drove backwards off the edge of the loading dock and died. 425
The autopsy results revealed that Meadows's blood-alcohol level was
.149 percent when the accident occurred. 426
Uncontested testimony showed that Meadows had been drinking on the day of the accident.427 One co-worker stated that it was
apparent Meadows had been drinking, as his eyes appeared "glossy"
and he acted "high. "428 Other employees who had previously used
the same fork lift as Meadows had no problem with the brakes or
steering, and, after the accident, a private investigator examining
420. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b) (West. Supp. 2000) (providing that when an
employee has a blood-alcohol level equal or greater than the level specified in
the motor vehicle title, there is a presumption the injury was "occasioned primarily by the intoxication ... of the employee") (citing id. § 316.193) (specifying the blood-alcohol level for a determination of intoxication for purposes
of driving under the influence of alcohol as .08 percent or higher»; see also
City of Tampa. v. Green, 390 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that the Workers' Compensation Deputy Commissioner has discretion to determine the reliability of the test being offered into evidence during
the initial trial).
421. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b). If the employer has a drug-free workplace
plan, the presumption may be rebutted "only by evidence that there is no reasonable hypothesis that the intoxication ... contributed to the i~ury." Id. If
there is no drug-free program, the employee may rebut the presumption by
"clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication ... did not contribute to
the injury." Id.
422. 460 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
423. See id. at 434.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See id.
427. See id. One co-worker testified that Meadows drank three beers before noon
and shared a half-pint of gin and grapefruit juice with another co-worker. See
id. at 434-35. Furthermore, Meadows had a record of drinking on the job. See
id. at 435.
428. Id.
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the lift could not detect any defects. 429
Claimant's rebuttal evidence rested on the testimony of two witnesses and his widow. 430 The two witnesses testified that Meadows
"did not appear intoxicated. "431 His wife testified that Meadows
"could 'hold his liquor.' "432 To effectively rebut the presumption of
intoxication the claimant must show either an independent or superseding cause of the accident,433 or that the accident would have
happened despite intoxication. 434
Mter considering the positive blood-alcohol test, co-workers'
testimony, documentary evidence and the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the primary cause of the accident
was the claimant's intoxication.435
In G.A. Meyer Paving & Construction v. Mdi'alls,436 the appellate
court, like the court in Orlando Waste Paper CO.,437 reversed the trial
court's holding that the claimant had presented substantial evidence
to rebut the presumption of positive blood-alcohol test results. 438
The claimant, McFalls, was returning to the job site after picking up
equipment parts when he crashed his car and died. 439 An autopsy
revealed a blood-alcohol level of .196 percent at the time of
death,440 raising the presumption of intoxication under the
statute. 441
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

434.

435.

436.
437.
438.

439.
440.
441.

See id.
See id.
[d.
[d.

See id. (citing City of Tampa v. Green, 390 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (concluding that substantial evidence provided by the claimant
warranted the commissioner's conclusion that the primary cause of the injury
was not intoxication».
See id. at 415. But see R.P. Hewitt & Assocs. of Fla. v. Murnighan, 382 So. 2d
353, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding that the claimant met the burden of proof by showing substantial evidence that intoxication was not the
primary cause of the accident).
See Orlando Waste Paper Co., 460 So. 2d at 435. But see id. at 434 (Smith, j., dissenting) (arguing that the limited function of appellate review does not allow
for a reweighing of the evidence presented and that the majority expropriated the fact-fInder's duty reversing the Deputy Commissioner).
453 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
See supra notes 326435 for a discussion of Orlando Waste Paper Co.
See C.A. Meyer Paving & Constr. v. McFalls, 453 So. 2d 912, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
See id. at 912-13.
See id. at 913.
See id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West Supp. 2000».
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McFalls's dependents rebutted the presumption by providing
testimony of co-workers claiming they had not seen him drinking,
nor had he appeared drunk before he departed. 442 Furthermore,
there was no evidence of alcohol in the vehicle that could have
proven McFalls was drinking after he departed and while he was
driving. 443 Nonetheless, this evidence did not prove to be substantial
enough to overcome the statutory presumption of intoxication. 444
Specifically, the court noted that even though McFalls did not appear intoxicated when he departed, his two and a half hour absence
prior to the accident was never explained. 445 Hence, the court held
that the presumption of section 440.09446 was not rebutted and that
the primary cause of the claimant's accident was his own
intoxication. 447
In RP. Hewitt & Associates of Florida v. Murnighan,448 the court
awarded Murnighan, an experienced ironworker, workers' compensation benefits in connection with an injury he sustained while employed by RP. Hewitt. 449 Murnighan and a co-worker had been welding iron grating to horizontal supports on a stairway forty feet
above the ground. 450 The grating slipped, and Murnighan fell between the supports with half of his torso through the hole. 451
Murninghan and his co-employee had two or three beers with
their lunch, a practice that was condoned by the foreman. 452
Murnighan's blood-alcohol level was recorded at 0.14,453 greater
than the statutorily prescribed leve1. 454 Five doctors testified, but not
definitively, to Murnighan's intoxicated condition. 455 In rebuttal, the
claimant's partner, his foreman, and other co-workers testified that
442. See id. at 913-14.
443. See id. at 913.
444. See id. (disagreeing there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of
intoxication) .
445. See id. at 913-14.
446. See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (providing a presumption of intoxication).
447. See McFalls, 453 So. 2d at 913.
448. 382 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
449. See id. at 354.
450. See id.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. See id.
454. See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(3) (West Supp. 2000) (referencing the motor vehicle title, which provides that the blood-alcohol level for a driving while intoxicated charge is .10 percent).
455. See Mumighan, 382 So. 2d at 354.
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not only did Murnighan not appear drunk during the course of the
day, but that grating work was normally quite hazardous. 456 The
claimant's partner stated that the accident actually occurred as a result of the grating already being out of line prior to Murnighan's
fal1. 457
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the reviewing
court agreed with the lower court, holding that the claimant's injury
was not occasioned primarily by his intoxication. 458 Sufficient testimony was presented to overcome the statutory presumption. 459 The
claimant was able to demonstrate that the dangerous occupation in
connection with the attendant circumstances surrounding the accident was enough to be the primary cause of the injury.460 Furthermore, the evidence indicated that a "completely sober man could
have suffered the same accident. "461
It is interesting to note that, in the first three cases examined,
the employee had died and therefore was unable to provide his
own rebuttable testimony. Whereas, in Murnigham, the employee
survived, offering his own testimony to rebut the scientific test results. This is instructive to Maryland law, as it appears that if the
person who is claiming benefits is available to testify, the scale may
be tipped in favor of the employee receiving workers' compensation
benefits.
In Arkansas, an employee can rebut the presumption of intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence that the intoxicants did
not substantially cause the injury.462 Maryland law omits an evidentiary standard for employer rebuttal. 463 Florida, on the other hand,
explicitly requires the employee to rebut by substantial evidence in
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 355.
See id.
See id. at 353 (agreeing with the trial judge's conclusion that the accident "primarily resulted from the inherent dangerousness of [the appellee's] work
upon the grating").
461. [d. at 355. But see Sterling v. Mike Brown, Inc., 580 So. 2d 832, 836 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding for defendant because, although decedent's dependents offered another cause for Sterling's death, there was insufficient evidence to avoid the presumption of intoxication); Avalos v. Willford Farms,
Inc., 561 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a deceased's dependants did not prove that there could have been another cause
of the deceased's accident besides intoxication).
462. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4) (B) (iv)(d) (Michie Supp. 1999).
463. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
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order to overcome the presumption of intoxication. 464

C.

Procedural Error, Scientific Testing

In the past few years, Florida courts have heard cases on the
admissibility and reliability of blood-alcohol testing procedures. 465 In
Beasley v. Mitel of Delaware,466 the examiners failed to follow the
proper alcohol testing procedures, which resulted in a finding that
the blood-alcohol test was unreliable. 467 Mter Beasley died in a high
speed car crash, his blood sample revealed a blood alcohol level of
0.16. 468 Beer cans and the aroma of alcohol filled the car, yet the investigating officer could not testify to the fact that Beasley drank
any alcohol because the officer did not see him prior to the
accident. 469
The crux of this case did not involve rebutting the statutory
presumption of intoxication;47o rather, the claimant's dependents
objected to the procedure utilized when testing his blood-alcohol
level.471 They contended, and the court agreed, that the evidentiary
admission fell outside the scope of the statutorily prescribed standards.472 Because the trial court admitted test results into evidence
without certifying their authenticity, the appellate court reversed,
holding that Florida law demands substantial compliance with statutory procedure when determining blood-alcohol levels. 473 Thus, the
464. See supra notes 388461 and accompanying text.
465. See Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 668 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996) (holding that
testing a claimant's blood serum is a proper way to test blood-alcohol content); J & J Baker Enters. v. Gaylord, 676 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (following Gibson by adhering to the admissibility of blood serum testing
to raise the required statutory presumption of intoxication); George H. Austin, Inc., v. Gardner, 440 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
Florida law relies on the percentage of blood-alcohol content at the time of
the employee's injury, not at the time the test is administered; thus, a reading
of exactly .10 would still raise the statutory presumption of intoxication).
466. 449 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
467. See id.
468. See id. at 366.
469. See id.
470. See id.
471. See id.
472. See id.; See also FlA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1933(2) (a) (West 1990) (delineating who
is authorized to draw blood); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1933(2) (b) (West 1990)
(providing how blood is to be drawn and subsequently analyzed).
473. See Beasley, 449 So. 2d at 367; FlA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1934(2). But see Tampa v.
Green, 390 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the admissibility of blood-alcohol tests rests in the discretion of the Deputy Commis-
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court maintained that the totality of the circumstances in Beasley exhibited "a lack of trustworthiness," and awarded the claimant
compensation. 474
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Domino's Pizza v. Gibson,475
certified that testing a claimant's blood serum, rather than whole
blood, is a reliable method, and thus admissible. 476 The court reasoned that Florida law, neither expressly nor impliedly, imposed restrictions on the procedure for proving blood-alcohol content. 477
Furthermore, serum blood-alcohol tests satisfied the Frye standard of
general scientific approval that Florida courts have followed for decades. 478 Thus, the Gibson court held that "the admission of evidence bear[s] upon an employee's intoxication comport[ing] with
the purpose of the statute, namely that an employee is not entitled
to receive workers' compensation benefits if an injury was caused by
the employee's intoxication. "479
However, a different approach to admissibility of tests has been
taken by the Arkansas Legislature. According to Arkansas law, simply by working, an employee "impliedly consent[s] to reasonable
and responsible [drug or alcohol] testing" by established professionsioner at trial).
474. Beasley, 449 So. 2d at 367. The court also concluded that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the "lack of trustworthiness" in the procedures utilized would also warrant the test results inadmissable under the business record hearsay exception. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(6»; see also
Brown v. State, 389 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that, although not reversible error, the trial court improperly allowed a doctor to testify about medical tests he neither performed nor had any knowledge regarding the actual testing processes).
475. 668 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996).
476. See id. at 594.
477. See Domino's Pizza, 668 So. 2d at 595, overruling, Florida Tile Industr. v. Dozier,
561 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that section 440.09(3)
required claimant's whole blood to be tested, not the blood serum). The Gibson court disagreed "with Florida Tile's narrow construction of section
440.09(3)." Id. Note that both cases were based upon the language of the
1991 statute. See id. at 595 n.2. To correct for the varying court interpretations
of section 440.09(3), the Florida legislature amended the section in 1994 to
expressly allow for the use of blood serum to test for blood-alcohol level. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b) (West Supp. 2000).
478. See Domino's Pizza, 668 So. 2d at 596; see also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)(holding that a "sufficiently established" scientific principle or discovery can be admitted at trial as expert testimony); Hayes v. State,
660 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 1995) (reaffirming the Frye test in Florida).
479. Domino's Pizza, 668 So. 2d at 596.
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als familiar with testing procedures. 48o However, Arkansas does not
detail what is reasonable and responsible testing.
Maryland's statute is silent on the issue of testing and testing
procedures. 481 Therefore, an examination of what types of bloodalcohol tests have been accepted by other courts, should provide
Maryland with sufficient guidance as to what kinds of procedures
should be allowed into evidence. 482 For example, Florida's law expressly outlines what types of scientific analyses will be admissible. 483
Maybe Maryland courts will decide, as have the Arkansas courts,
that the employer-employee relationship itself permits reasonable
and adequate drug and alcohol testing procedures to be automatically used in determining the cause of work-related iI?Juries.

D.

Estoppel

One issue Maryland must address is whether to permit any exceptions to the intoxication defense. Professions that warrant a special exception, such as, those where being allowed to drink on the
job is permitted, including undercover law enforcement officers or
alcohol salesmen, should be examined. Courts also have to determine whether there are any occasions when drinking on the job
should not be allowed. For example, holiday parties or after-hours
functions. A final area that must be addressed is the consequences
of an employer being aware of an employee's drinking on the job
and refusal to take any action.
Florida law, unlike Maryland law, provides the employee with a
defense to the employer's statutory presumption that when alcohol
is involved in an accident, the claimant's injury is primarily caused
by intoxication. 484 Specifically, the employer will be estopped from
raising the defense of employee intoxication if, prior to the accident, the employer had "actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee's presence at the workplace while under the
influence of such alcohol or drug. "485
Construing the precise meaning of the estoppel clause has
been heavily debated in the Florida courts. 486 Most recently, the
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv)(c) (Michie Supp. 1999).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-506 (1999).
See supra notes 34547 and accompanying text.
See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b) (West Supp. 2000).
[d.

See Stepanek v. Rinker Materials Corp., 697 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (construing the precise language of the estoppel defense to mean that
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Florida appellate court, in Stepanek v. Rinker Materials Corp.,487 attempted to put an end to this debate. Stepanek appeared for work
one day after an evening of heavy boozing and insufficient rest. 488
His supervisor, smelling alcohol on his breath, did not confront
Stepanek for fear of being mistaken. 489 While Stepanek boarded a
cinder block cubing machine to arrange some cinder blocks, the
operator of the machine, not noticing Stepanek's location, rolled
over Stepanek's foot.49o
Tests revealed Stepanek's blood-alcohol level to be 0.15 percent,491 which invoked the presumption of intoxication. 492 However,
Stepanek claimed that the employer was estopped from utilizing the
presumption, because his supervisor knew that he was intoxicated
before he began working that day.493 The court held that, although
testimony demonstrated the supervisor knew that Stepanek was
under the influence of alcohol, that evidence did not amount to
the supervisor's "express acquiesce[nce] in this state of affairs."494

487.
488.

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

"a claimant must show the employer made some overt expression, either by
words or conduct, showing that although the employer knew the claimant was
under the influence of intoxicants, the claimant could nevertheless remain at
work ... n}; Sterling v. Mike Brown, Inc., 580 So. 2d 832, 834-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (applying a three-prong test in holding that an employer was not
estopped from raising the intoxication defense where the employer derived
no business benefit from a company Christmas party); Avalos v. Williford
Farms, Inc., 561 So. 2d 1344, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that specific employer involvement, demonstrating approval of employees' intoxication, was required to estop an employer from raising the intoxication defense,
and finding that casually sharing a few beers with employees was not sufficient
to meet that requirement); West Fla. Distribs. v. Laramie, 438 So. 2d 133, 13536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that employer was estopped from raising intoxication defense where employer expressed it was a common practice
of employees to drink on the job as part of their employment as liquor salesmen to further their product knowledge). Cf. Duval Eng'g & Contracting Co.
v. Johnson, 16 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 1944) (holding an employer was not estopped from raising defense of intoxication where employee suffered accident
in connection with an annually established social function financed by the
employer and meant to derive more business for the employer).
697 So. 2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
See id. at 201.
See id. at 201-02.
See id. at 201.
See id.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44O.09(7} (b) (West Supp. 2000).
See Stepanek, 697 So. 2d at 202.
Id.
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In construing what the legislature meant by "express acquiescence," the court determined that'" [e]xpress' mean[t] clear and
unmistakable, not left to inference, while 'acquiescence' mean[t]
passive compliance or assent inferred from silence. "495 Presuming
that the legislature did not intend" 'express acquiescence' to be a
contradiction in terms,"496 the court held that the employee must
prove the "employer made some overt expression, either by words
or conduct, showing that although the employer knew the claimant
was under the influence of intoxicants, the claimant could nevertheless remain at work in such condition. "497 The court stated there
was no certain knowledge on the employer's part that Stepanek was
indeed intoxicated and no such overt communication that Stepanek
could remain on the job while under the influence.498 Therefore,
the court concluded that the claimant's injury was primarily caused
by his intoxication. 499
In Iowa, the court went beyond statutory law and established an
exception to the general workers' compensation rule whereby
" [work related] injuries caused by intoxication are generally not
compensable. "500 In 2800 Corp. v. Ferdandez,501 the employer was held
liable for an employee's injuries where evidence was sufficient to
support the conclusion that the employer condoned drinking on
the job.502 The court reasoned that where the employer encourages
drinking to benefit business, the employer should be held responsible for foreseeable injuries suffered by the employee as a result of
his or her intoxication. 503
Similarly, in Utah, there are two exceptions for which a claimant may still be awarded compensation benefits even though intoxicants are found to be the major contributing cause of the employee's injury.504 First, consistent with Florida and Iowa, Utah
estops an employer from raising the intoxication defense "when the
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

[d. (citing
[d.

BLACK'S

LAw

DICfIONARY

580,24 (6th ed. 1990».

[d.

See id.
See id.
2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W. 124, 128 (Iowa 1995) (examining a workers' compensation claim filed by an exotic dancer who was injured on her way
home from work due to her intoxicated condition, which was known and condoned by her employer).
501. 528 N.W. 124 (Iowa 1995).
502. See id.
503. See id.
504. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-302 (1999).
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employer permitted, encouraged, or had actual knowledge of the
[employee's use of illegal substances or alcohol.] "505 Second, in contrast to a majority of states, Utah will disregard the cause of injury
and award compensation to the dependents of an employee in cases
of work-related injury that result in the employee's death.506
Viewing other states' exceptions to the intoxication defense
gives Maryland courts guidance when deciding whether to allow employees to raise certain issues in order to rebut the fact that alcohol
was indeed the primary cause of their injuries. Generally, it has
been accepted that a showing of additional evidence that the employer "permitted" the consumption of alcoholic beverages may,
nevertheless, entitle an employee to receive workers' compensation
benefits. 507

E.

Miscellaneous Issues

The Florida statute addresses two particular areas of workers'
compensation benefits and injury resulting from employee intoxication which generates some doubt as to whether the General Assembly should make substantive changes to Maryland's law. First, the
Florida statute addresses the issue of what conclusion, if any, can be
drawn from an employee who suffers an injury, yet refuses to take a
breathalyser or drug test. Florida law, unlike the new Maryland law,
provides for a presumption of intoxication if the employee refuses
to take a drug test. 50S The statute states: "[i]f the injured worker refuses to submit to a drug test, it [is] presumed in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary that the injury was
occasioned primarily by the influence of drugs. "509
Second, the Florida statute also provides for a Drug Free Workplace program, which entitles participating employers to greater
benefits when invoking the statute as a defense. 510 One such benefit
is that a higher burden of proof is placed upon the employee when
countering that intoxication was not the primary cause of injury.511
For example, if an employee tests positively for drugs or alcohol in
505. Id. § .34A-2-302(2)(b).
506. See id. § 34A-2-302(2). Subsection (2) was added by amendment effective May
1, 1995. See 1995 UTAH LAws ch. 328, § 2.
507. See supra notes 484-503 and accompanying text.
508. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (a)-(d) (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
509. Id. § 440.09(c).
510. See id. § 440.09(7)(b).
511. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(7) (b) (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
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accordance with statutory procedures, the presumption of intoxication against the employee can only be rebutted
[B]y evidence that there is no reasonable hypothesis that
the intoxication or drug influence contributed to the injury.
In the absence of a Drug-Free Workplace program, [the]
presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did
not contribute to the injury.512
Another benefit for employers substantially complying with the
Drug Free Workplace Initiative is that no "compensation," meaning
both disability and medical benefits, will be awarded to a claimant if
injury was primarily caused by intoxication. 513 Maryland also denies
full compensation to claimants, but only if the injury was occasioned solely by the employee's intoxication. 514 Otherwise, only disability benefits will be denied.515 Medical benefits can still be awarded
under sections 9-660 and 9-661. 516
The issues addressed by the Florida statute, but not by Maryland law, may necessitate Maryland legislators making substantive
changes to the law. Meanwhile, as Florida is the only jurisdiction
with an intoxication standard of review verbatim to Maryland's,
courts in Maryland may refer to Florida's workers' compensation
statute and case law for guidance.
VII. CONCLUSION
The workers' compensation system is based upon social principles. 517 The social responsibility is to financially compensate those
who, as a result of an unfortunate accident, are injured on the
job.518 However, the system has evolved to the point where some
persons are not protected. Employees who are intoxicated while
512. [d. However, no presumption in the employer's favor is applied if it is deter-

513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

mined that the employer expressly acquiesced to the intoxication or drug use.
See id. See supra Part VI.D for a discussion of when an employer is estopped
from raising the intoxication defense.
See id. § 440.09(3); see also Gustafson's Dairy, Inc./Profl Adm'rs Inc. v. Phillips,
656 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(b), (c) (1999).
See id.
See id. § 9-506(d).
See supra Parts II, III (discussing the historical development of the workers'
compensation system).
See supra Parts II, III (discussing the general nature of the workers' compensation system).
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working not only pose a hazard to themselves, but also to their fellow workers. 519 As it has been shown, intoxicated employees are responsible for increasing employers' insurance costs. 520 Thus, awarding benefits to employees who are injured due to their own
intoxication is socially irresponsible and, strikes at the very foundation of the workers' compensation system. 521
Since its inception, the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act
has included an "intoxication» defense to claims for benefits by injured workers.522 However, the scope of the defense was narrowly
defined by the statute and strictly applied by the Commission and
the courts.523 Specifically, in order to bar recovery of compensation
benefits, an employee's intoxication must have been the sole cause
of the accident. 524 Consequently, some employers were forced to pay
benefits to employees for injuries seemingly caused by their own
fault. For example, the estate of an employee killed after consuming approximately
one-half pints of liquor before falling down a
stairwell was not precluded from recovery.525 The employer, invoking the intoxication defense, did not meet his burden of showing
not only that the employee was intoxicated, but also that his death
or injury was solely occasioned by the intoxication. 526
In 1998, as a result of the inequity in the law, the Maryland intoxication defense was changed. 527 Section 9-506 now provides that
there shall be no liability for monetary compensation where the injury was primarily caused by the intoxication of the injured employee. 528 If the defense is proven, the only benefit available to the
claimant under the Workers' Compensation Act is medical care and
treatment. 529 As with the prior version of the Act, this revised ver-

two

519. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the magnitude of substance abuse in the workplace and its effects on the workers' compensation system).
520. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the increased costs due
to substance abuse).
521. See supra notes 250-74 and accompanying text.
522. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion the affirmative defense of intoxication.
523. See supra Part V.A for a discussion of Maryland's sole cause case history and
its strict application.
524. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
525. See supra 161-72 and accompanying text.
526. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
527. See supra Part V.B for a discussion of Maryland's legislative development of
the present Labor and Employment section 9-506.
528. See supra notes 152-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of Maryland's
sole cause case history and its strict application.
529. See supra notes 299-303.
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sion still mandates that employers bear the burden of proof when
invoking this affirmative defense. 53o
However, section 9-506 also provides a presumption in favor of
employees. 531 Specifically, the statute states that, "absent substantial
evidence to the contrary, [there is] a presumption that the intoxication of the covered employee was not the primary cause of the accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or occupational disease. "532 This presumption has proven to be the determining factor
in cases where intoxication is raised as a defense. 533
The newly enacted Maryland Workers' Compensation Act's primary cause standard is unique by nationwide standards. 534 In fact,
Florida is the only other state to adopt this language. 535 While the
standard lies somewhere between intoxication being the sole cause
of the accident and intoxication being simply a cause of an injury,536
the exact meaning of this standard has not yet been construed by
Maryland courts. Therefore, a review of cases in which this standard
was applied in Florida courts could playa critical role for Maryland's commissioners and judges. 537
Although the Maryland General Assembly altered the standard
of review for the intoxicati.on defense, it left unresolved some of the
basic procedures to guide employers in how to utilize the affirmative defense. 538 Specifically, the statute does not address the manner
in which the presence of illicit substances must be established. 539
Further, the statute does not discuss the weight of proof required
for an employer to rebut the presumption, nor does it detail what
types of evidence will be deemed admissible. 540 Also, the statute
does not explicitly address the situation where an employee unjustifiably refuses to submit to a drug or alcohol test. 541 As the foregoing
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

539.
540.
541.

See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 281-82.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-506(g)(2) (1999).
See supra Parts VA and V.B.
See Appendix.
See id.
See supra Part V for a discussion of different causation standards of intoxication.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part VI for a discussion of the proposed effects and possible issues
stemming from section 9-506 accompanied by an examination of other state's
.
statutes and resulting case law.
See supra notes 378-84, 507, 514 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 385-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 298-308, 508-09 and accompanying text.
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illustrates, many procedural issues remain unresolved, both in general and regarding the effect that the new decreased standard may
have on the revised Workers' Compensation ACt. S42

Nicole Pastore

542. See supra notes 517-41 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
STATE

DISQYES

ALA. CODE § 25-5-51
(1992)
ALAsKA STAT.
§ 23.30.235 (Michie
1998)

PENALTY

STANDARD
OF REVIEW

X

0.00

Due to; Caused by

X

0.00

Proximately cause

ARIz. REv. STAT. (1998)

DISQNO

X

No provision

ARK. CoDE ANN. § 11-9102(5) (B) (iv) (a)
(Michie 1996)

X

0.00

Substantially
occasioned by

CAL. LAB. CoDE

X

0.00

Caused by

CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 842-112 (West 1994)

X

Reduced by
50%

Results from

CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

X

0.00

Caused by

X

0.00

As a result of

D.G CoDE ANN. § 36303 (d) (1997)

X

0.00

Occasioned solely
by

FlA STAT. ANN.

X

0.00

Occasioned
primarily by

GA. CoDE ANN. § 34-917(B) (1998)

X

0.00

Due to

HAw. REv. STAT. ANN.

X

0.00

Incurred by;
Caused by

X

0.00

Reasonable and
substantial cause of

§ 3600(a)(4) (West
1989)

§ 31-284(a); § 31275(lc) (West 1997)
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 19,

§ 2353(b) (1995)

§ 440.09(3) (West
1991)

§ 386-3 (MICHIE 1993)
IDAHO CoDE § 72-208
(1999)
ILL. CoMP. STAT. (West
1993)

No provision

X

IND. CoDE. ANN. § 22-32-8 (Michie 1997)

X

0.00

Due to

IOWA CoDE ANN.

X

0.00

Substantial factor

X

0.00

Contributed to

§ 85.16(2) (West 1996)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44501 (d)(2) (1996)
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Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 342.610(3) (Banks-
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X

0.00

Due to

X

0.00

Caused by

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
39-A, § 202 (West
2000)

X

0.00

Resulting from

MD. CODE ANN., LAB.

X

0.00

Primary Cause

Baldwin 1999)
LA. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 23:1081(I)(b) (West
1998)

& EMPL.

§ 9-506(a)-(c) (1999)
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
(WEST 2000)

X

No Reterant Statute

MICH. STAT. ANN. (LAw
CO-OP 2000)

X

No Reterant Statute

X

0.00

Proximate cause

MISS. CoDE ANN. § 713-7 (1999)

X

0.00

Proximate cause

Mo. ANN. STAT.

X

0.00

Proximate cause

MONT. CODE ANN. § 3971-407(4) (1999)

X

0.00

Sole & Exclusive

NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-127 (Michie 1999)

X

0.00

Being in a state of
intoxication

NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN.
§ 616C.230(1) (c) &
(d) (Michie 1995)

X

0.00

Proximately caused
by

N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.

X

0.00

Caused in whole or
in part

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:157 (West 1988)

X

0.00

Natural and
Proximate cause

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 521-11 & -12 (Michie
1991)

X

0.00

Proximately Caused

N.Y. WORK. COMPo LAw

X

0.00

Solely due to

X

0.00

Proximately caused
by

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 176.021(1) (West
1993)

§ 287.120(6) (2) (West
1993)

§ 281-A:14(1999)

§§ 10 & 21 (McKinney
1992)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12
(1999)
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 6501'{)2(7) (1983)

X

0.00

Caused by

OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.54(8) (West
1995)

X

0.00

Proximate cause

OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit.
85, § 11 (West 1992)

X

0.00

Results directly
from

OR. REv. STAT.
§ 656.005 (1997)

X

0.00

Major Contributing
Cause

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 41 (West 1992)

X

0.00

Proximate cause

RI. GEN. LAws § 28-332 (1995)

X

0.00

Results from

S.c. CODE ANN. § 42-960 (Law. Co-op 1985)

X

0.00

Proximate cause

S.D. CODInED LAws
§ 624-37 (Michie
1983)

X

0.00

Due to

TENN. CODE ANN. § 506-110(a)-(c) (1) (1999)

X

0.00

Proximate cause

TEX. LAB.
CoDE ANN.
§ 406.032(1) (A)
(West 1996)

X

0.00

While in a state of
intoxication

UTAH CoDE ANN.
§ 34A-2-302 (1997)

X

0.00

Major contributing
cause

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 649 (1987)

X

0.00

Caused by

VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2306 (Michie 1995)

X

0.00

Caused by

WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.
(West 1990)
W. VA. CODE § 234-2

No provision

X

X

0.00

Caused by

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.58 (West 1997) ,

X

Reduced 15%

Results from

WYO. STAT. ANN. §27-14102(a) (xi) (8) (I)
(Michie 1999)

X

0.00

Caused by

(1998)
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STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTORY
PROVISIONS DISQUALIFYING INJURED WORKERS
FROM BENEFITS IF INJURY DUE TO:
STATE

INTOXICATION

DRUG ABUSE

Alabama

X

X

Alaska

X

X

Arkansas

X

X

California

X

Colorado

X

X

Connecticut

X

X

Delaware

X

D.C.

X

Florida

X

X

Georgia

X

X

Hawaii

X

Idaho

X

Arizona

X

Illinois
Indiana

X

Iowa

X

X

Kansas

X

X

Louisiana

X

X

Maine

X

Maryland

X

Kentucky

X

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

X

Mississippi

X

Missouri

X

X

Montana

X

X

Nebraska

X

Nevada

X

New Hampshire

X

X

"Sole" Cause in Workers' Compensation

2000]
New Jersey

X

X

New Mexico

X

X

New York

X

X

North Carolina

X

X

North Dakota

X

X

Ohio

X

X

Oklahoma

X

X

Oregon

X

X

Pennsylvania

X

Rhode Island

X

South Carolina

X

South Dakota

X

Tennessee

X

Texas

X

X

Utah

X

X

Vermont

X

Virginia

X

X

X

X

Washington
West Virginia

X

Wisconsin

X

X

Wyoming

X

X

TOTAL

45

30

X = YES

BLANK

=

SILENT
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